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ABSTRACT

This book is the second in a set of three study guides designed to help students of educational administration critically analyze contemporary theory in the field, examine the field from a new viewpoint, and develop their own, more practical knowledge base. The first of the book's three sections, by Gerry England, discusses three ways of thinking about educational administration. These three approaches parallel the traditional positivist, the phenomenological, and the critical traditions in social science. They can be identified as technical rationality (drawing on empirical-analytical science), practical rationality (based on hermeneutic-interpretive science), and critical practice (related to critical-dialectical science). The second section, by Peter Watkins, examines how educational administration became a technique of control rather than emancipation through the transfer of scientific management practices and ideologies from the arena of industrial management to that of school management. The problems caused by the dominance of this approach are reviewed. The third section, by John Codd, focuses on conceptualizing educational administration as the administering of education rather than as the organizational management of the school as an institution. Readings and activities for improved understanding are recommended, and over 100 references are cited. (PGD)

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Thinking About Educational Administration

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

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EED431
Introduction to Educational Administration

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Thinking About Educational Administration

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The course includes:
Study Guide 1: *Tradition and Turmoil in Educational Administration*
Study Guide 2: *Thinking About Educational Administration*
Study Guide 3: *Critical Practice in Educational Administration*
Reader: *Reflective Readings in Educational Administration*

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'Interlock', aluminium construction by F. C. and M. Hinder, 1979, Deakin University.

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SECTION 3
THREE APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Gerry England



Untitled, welded steel by G. Johnston, 1975, Deakin University.

THREE APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Gerry England

Introduction

In recent years interrelated social, political, economic and educational change has resulted in the practice of educational administration becoming more demanding and complex. In the early 1970s, at the climax of the post-war period of sustained economic growth and prosperity, substantially increased levels of educational funding by the federal and state governments—especially the federal government—was accompanied by a focus on equality of opportunity in terms of minimum standards of provision and choice and diversity in schooling. The funding and new focus have been inspired and fostered by the policies of the Schools Commission, after it was set up by the federal government in 1973 to advise on the needs of primary and secondary schools. Increasingly, there has been a delegation of authority to decentralised regions and to school principals. Schools Commission policies have actively encouraged the devolution of decision making through greater participation by teachers and parents. Some developments include school-based curriculum development and evaluation, school-site management, lump-sum budgeting for schools, increased powers and functions for school councils, and conscious efforts to strengthen parental and community involvement in the life of schools. At the same time teachers have become more qualified academically and have gained more professional autonomy through such developments as the 'Schools Commission Innovations Programme' and the advent of a more liberal system of teacher and school evaluation (the focus changing to one of professional development, with a more consultative role for the former school inspectors who have had a change of title in most states).

From the latter half of the 1970s, however, there has been an economic downturn associated with much reduced population growth and declining enrolments. A bad but unfounded public image of government schools has developed. New areas of educational funding tend to be introduced only where they have a clear economic or political return such as in technical education and schemes for easing the transition from school to work and coping with problems associated with high youth unemployment. There is a changing emphasis from equality of opportunity to quality in education. The proportion of students in independent schools is rising, probably as a result of some parents' dissatisfaction with the performance of state schools, the attraction of increased levels of government funding to independent schools, and the belief that independent schooling improves job prospects. There is a growing trend for parents to be more discerning with respect to choosing state schools, both primary and secondary. As more schools experience declining enrolments in the context of dezoning provisions, they refine their educational 'products' in order to compete for students. Resource stringencies, an increasing pressure for accountability of a quantitative and financial kind, together with public anxiety about falling standards

have arrested the earlier trends towards more liberal education systems. This is reflected in the emphasis on matters such as productivity in the economy, national monitoring of student achievement, centrally recommended curricula and systems-based management in education, some of which are evident in recent documents such as the Williams Report (Committee of Inquiry in Education and Training 1979) on education and training in Australia, and the Keeves Reports (Committee of Inquiry into Education in South Australia 1981, 1982) on education and change in South Australia.

Another factor affecting the work of administrators is continuing teacher militancy, especially in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, which first became prominent in the late 1960s. Key issues then were teacher shortages, resource levels (including provision of ancillary staffing), and the professional issue of teacher assessment. Current matters of concern are financial cutbacks, the increase in the proportion of federal government funds directed to independent schools, and control in schools and the education system, including control of aspects of the curriculum.

These changes have placed new pressures on administrators at all levels. In 1978 an American educationist spent time in Australia observing its education systems. He met a range of people involved in education (such as teachers, parents, principals and interest group representatives), but spent much of his time with top level administrators in central offices. He gained the impression that

> many state level educators are feeling besieged—and that's bad. Politicians are getting too involved in administrative matters. Parents are challenging professional prerogatives. Militant teachers want autonomy but not responsibility. The federal government is meddling with state priorities. Taxpayers want more education for fewer dollars. In this view the good old days of unchallenged professional leadership are over, and rough days lie ahead (Murphy 1980, p.1).

At the school level, the nature of the principal's role has changed. From all sides demands on the principal are greater, and of a different kind than they were in the early 1970s and before: indeed

> today's principal has become responsible in the most public and immediate sense for all that happens in his or her school. The increasing complexity of the demands upon the principal, the expectation that he/she will perform in a manner and to a level which will satisfy all those who legitimately look to that office for satisfaction, the growing preparedness of interested parties to challenge the principal's performance as it is translated into the various operational phases of the school ... set up a mounting accountability press that can only be met ... even survived, by those with competencies that fit them to the task (Chittenden 1981, p. 2).

Beare (1982) argues that a free market now operates in schooling, and that school managers should realise that schools no longer have monopolies over students, and that any decline in 'productivity' or customer dissatisfaction will result in loss of clients and, consequently, of some funding and staff.

> If your school wants customers and resources in the next few years, you had better proclaim how good it is, how competitive are its services ... [and] you had better use its resources—capital, monetary, personnel—in ways that will maximize profits. Over the next decade only successful, positive client oriented schools will have a right to survive, or to be rewarded with improved resources (Beare 1982, p. 17).

Among the knowledge and skills for which educational administrators now strongly feel the need are: the preparation and presentation of cases to government officials and agencies at various levels of the education

system; the effective use of political skills (involving knowledge and ability to influence decision and policy making processes, for example lobbying skills); the fostering of good public relations; the handling of industrial disputes and industrial action; the encouragement of strong school–community interaction; and a range of managerial techniques including financial accounting and budgeting, and decision making and policy development.

Clearly, social and educational developments have led to change in schools and educational systems as organisations. They have grown more complex, and, in particular, authority relationships in them now acknowledge professional discretion, individual rights, and sub-cultural differences.

These changes are not unique to Australia as Boyd & Crowson (1981) point out with respect to North America.

> The pressures placed on schools on behalf of equality, efficiency, effectiveness, and the performance problems these pressures brought to light, have led to far-reaching changes: a virtual revolution in authority relations: a sense of crisis about the normative order of schools: a serious decline in public confidence and support, and substantial changes in school governance (Boyd & Crowson 1981, p. 356).

Activity 3.1

From your experience, what are some of the changes which have occurred in the work of school administrators in the past several years? Do you think that their work is now more demanding as a result?

Ferment in educational administration

Social and educational changes have been accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to the study of educational administration; by a sharpened awareness of, and interest in, its philosophical foundations; by the appearance of a diversity of new models; and by controversy and debate. The traditional paradigm comprises mainly systems theory, theory of bureaucracy, role theory and decision theory.

> The theories held many assumptions in common. They assumed that organizations have goals that members strive to attain, that there are roles, sets of expectations for the members that are agreed upon (the nomothetic dimension), that behavior is more or less governed by a set of rules (bureaucratic structure), that decision-making is a systematic process, that only legitimate power is employed, and that merit is superior to politics. Administration, organizations and organizational behaviour were viewed as essentially orderly and rational ... [functioning] regardless of the individuals within them (Griffiths 1977, p. 1).

This view is losing favour among educational administrators because it is considered inadequate to describe current organisations, to explain behaviour in them, and to cope with the more difficult current problems, especially those concerning student outcomes and accountability. One result has been an intensified interest in specific areas of study, such as those concerned with socio-political and economic forces affecting schooling. Examples include the politics of education and policy analysis, educational law, the economics of education and educational finance and collective bargaining (Boyd & Crowson 1981).

A second result has been the development of new models to take account of the greater complexity of educational organisations, their conflictual character, their many seemingly non-rational elements and the changing nature of authority relationships within them. One approach, termed the 'garbage can model', characterises educational organisations

as 'organised anarchies'. Goals are inconsistent, changing, the subject of conflict, difficult to translate into practice and often the outcomes of, rather than the basis for, decision processes. The people in them understand poorly the processes by which they work, and cannot be sure of what the effects will be if changes are made. Students, teachers and administrators change frequently, and the involvement of parents, community and governmental agencies is erratic, capricious and contingent (Cohen et al. 1972).

A related approach uses a 'loose coupling theory', which draws attention to the often weak connection between the elements of an organisation and its processes and outcomes. For example, teaching is loosely coupled with the administration, for it is infrequently inspected and perfunctorily evaluated. Changes in curriculum, materials and student organisation have little impact on student outcomes (Weick 1976; Meyer & Rowan 1978).

A third model is 'contingency theory'. In this view, there is no one best way of understanding organisations and administration, nor of carrying out administrative processes such as planning, leading, motivating and evaluating. These are contingent upon the character of the organisation in question, the organisational environment at that particular time, and the current problems and tasks facing the organisation. Contingency theory provides a framework for the analysis of research and experience, for generating research problems along with hypotheses and for understanding and handling practical situations. For example, contingency theories have been developed for leadership, management and the relationship between organisation and environment. Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership specifies the situational conditions appropriate for task leadership and leadership promoting good organisational relations and climate (Fiedler 1967). The type of managerial role which is appropriate in a given situation depends on the nature of environmental variables, the nature of the management work being undertaken (e.g. level in the organisation), the personality and style of the person concerned, and situational variables such as the aspect of the administrator's work (for instance, parent relations) which has current salience (Sergiovanni et al. 1980).

A challenge to the traditional approach in educational administration is the phenomenological view of organisations (Greenfield 1975, 1980). In this view organisations are not goal-oriented social systems in which people's behaviour can be understood in terms of the normative requirements of roles and the exercise of legitimate authority. Nor are they entities which 'emerge naturally' to meet the needs of society and of the individual. Rather, they are social creations, the products of people in interaction seeking to realise their ends. These ends differ, and often conflict, so that organisations involve struggle and attempts by people to impose particular sets of values and beliefs on each other. Understanding of organisations depends upon knowledge of the intentions of members, and the meanings they attribute to actions and situations. Social reality comprises human interpretations; it is not independent of men and constituted by universal laws which govern their relationships and actions. Moreover, meanings, intentions and social practices are always in the process of 'becoming', of being produced, sustained and changed by negotiation among those involved. It is not to be expected that people as members of an organisation have the same purposes, views of their behaviour within it or reasons for belonging.

> The aim of scientific investigation is to understand how the making of reality goes on at one time and place and to compare it with what goes on in different times and places... Theory becomes the sets of meanings which yield insight and understanding of people's behaviour (Greenfield 1975, p. 83).

It is 'likely to be as diverse as the sets of human meanings and understandings' (p. 83) which are the object of understanding.

Another challenge to traditional educational administration is based in the 'new sociology of education' (Young 1971; Flude & Ahier 1974; Young & Whitty 1977; Bates 1978, 1980a) and neo-Marxist approaches to the political economy of education (Karabel & Halsey 1977; Bowles & Gintis 1976). In a capitalist society there is a structure of power and advantage based on the fundamental separation of people into employees and owners or controllers of the means of production. In reality this division of labour gives rise to a complex class structure comprising groups with often contradictory interests. Bates (1980b) proposes that 'what counts as knowledge is closely related to the interests and power of social groups' (p. 9). Thus there is a close relationship between structures of knowledge and structures of control in society, for knowledge affects what people believe and their self-concepts, and can be used to justify a particular set of social arrangements. In particular, what counts as knowledge in schools reflects the distribution of power in society and the principles of social control undergirding it. Important considerations include how what counts as educational knowledge is organised and transmitted, and how access to it is determined, controlled and justified. Educational administration is important in processes of structuring knowledge (and therefore in processes of control in society) for it involves responding to economic and political pressures, developing policies, implementing organisational procedures concerned with such matters as student differentiation, curriculum, assessment and evaluation, and (above all) the exercise of legitimate power (Bates 1980b).

Such an approach is a critical one, because, rather than accepting, it treats as problematic the framework of societal values and interests within which the administration of schools is accomplished. The implication is that the administrator should try to understand the society and institution within which he or she works, not from the point of view of control and system maintenance, but in order to realise values such as self-determination, justice, freedom from oppressive authority and equality of opportunity.

Activity 3.2
Has the nature of schools and colleges changed during the time you have been associated with them? If so in what ways? Do any of the models mentioned above appear to be appropriate ways of understanding any changes that have taken place?

Competing perspectives

The 'garbage can', 'loose coupling' and 'contingency' models are examples of attempts to capture the nature of current organisational realities while still holding the traditional concepts of social science and social theory. In fact, many adherents of these traditional concepts (which currently underly the dominant paradigm, or framework of ideas, in theory and research in educational administration) stress the need for a range of theories (and research strategies) if there is to be an improvement in the

refer to patterned sets of actions constrained by the meanings of norms and values which constitute any social context. Social and political life, in other words, is always a moral stance of one kind or another (Shapiro 1974; Cherryholmes 1980).

3. A third point of importance is that positivism and empirical-analytic science contain a problematic, 'a conceptional structure that can be identified both by the questions it raises and the questions it is incapable of raising' (Giroux 1980, p. 332). As we have seen, positivism, cannot consider the question of whether values and interests are integral with science. Together with empirical-analytic science it lacks the conceptual orientation to conceive itself as a system of social and human interaction involving norms, purposes and shared meanings. The limitations of the problematic are shown by the extension of a technical rationality and instrumental mode of action into more and more spheres of social life along with the development of industrial society. Educational administrators imbued with this mode of rationality would for example, be interested in how smoothly and efficiently schools function; in manipulating and controlling educational environments so that thought and behaviour are in line with prescribed goals, and behaviour occurs along predictable lines. Thinking in this way inhibited a concern with how other people think and feel and with promoting mutual understanding. It also deflects attention from patterns of authority and their relationship with repression and emancipation.

4. We can ask whether there is a valid place for empirical-analytic science and the practice of technical control. We reject a positivistic orientation because it identifies science with empirically verified fact and predictive knowledge. There is a place, however, for empirical-analytic science used in a critical, self-reflective way. This would mean awareness that the knowledge obtained is relative to a socially created and historically specific reality – that is, a reality which may in part contain relationships which can in principle be transformed. Instrumental action based on predictive knowledge would have to be accompanied by an 'ideology critique' to ensure that the control achieved served emancipatory rather than repressive interests.

As an example of empirical-analytic science, we take the research into the participation of teachers in decision making of Mohrman et al. (1978). They develop propositions from assumptions rooted in systems theory and contingency theory. The purpose was to clarify the 'reality' of decision making in educational organisations (this turns out to be multi-dimensional) and to establish relationships between the extent of participation in particular kinds of decision making (at the management and classroom levels) and degree of teacher satisfaction. Clearly knowledge of such relationships would provide the basis for more effective control of change in schools. In fact, one reason given for the research is the unsatisfactory nature of previous studies from the point of view of predictive utility. One implication made in the discussion of results is that teacher unions could achieve a more satisfied membership if they discriminated 'between technical and managerial decisions when attempting to increase teacher participation and influence' (Mohrman et al. 1978, p. 26). A critic of this conclusion would claim that it diverts ones attention from the possibility of changing the nature of school systems themselves, and therefore the ways in which these systems foreclose the possibility of a type of organisational life promoting autonomy, self-determination and personal development.

Reading 3
A. M. Mohrman et al., 'Participation in decision making: A multi-dimensional perspective', *Educational Administration Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1978, pp. 13–29.

Activity 3.4
What in your view are the practical implications for the administration of schools of the findings reported in the Mohrman et al. reading?

We have explained the concept of technical rationality and have shown how this can be criticised on several grounds. How can these criticisms be used as a response to participation in decision making as conceptualised by Mohrman et al.?

Practical rationality and educational administration

Hermeneutic-interpretive science

The phenomenological critique of traditional approaches in educational administration is based on hermeneutic-interpretive science. 'Hermeneutics may be defined as the science of interpretation or the phenomenology of understanding' (Van Manen 1977, p. 213). Knowledge is not sought in the form of law-like hypotheses; instead the purpose is understanding of the communicative and symbolic patterns of social interaction. There is an attempt to reveal the meaning of people's actions, both in terms of their own individual purposes and interpretations and of the sets of social rules, or the social practices, which govern and give sense to those actions within particular social contexts. A feeling for the significance of social rules is provided by a consideration of what might happen if an educational administrator attempted to sell his patronage to individuals and groups within the organisation! The full meaning of actions and rules can only be determined by uncovering the assumptions or 'constitutive meanings' (Fay 1975, p. 76) which underlie them. Administration as a social practice, or set of rules, depends for its viability on shared assumptions concerning the functional necessity of hierarchical division of labour, the technical basis of legitimate authority, and the instrumental character of organisational goals and activities.

In the interpretive mode, theory is not constructed deductively, nor comprised of empirically verified, invariant propositions. Nor is it context free and independent of its knowing subjects. It is specific to particular individuals and groups, and seeks to show how acts and experiences are given purpose and intelligibility by individuals, social rules and basic assumptions about society, organisations and human nature. Meaning lies not in objective, causal relationships, but in human intentions and interpretations. These are constantly negotiated and renegotiated, reproduced and transformed through interaction which, in turn, shapes and is shaped by social rules and assumptions. Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation. Social reality is constituted by particular individuals and groups and they can know it only in terms of their own values, meanings and motivations. The criteria for truth are firstly agreement between subject and observer concerning actions and beliefs and the nature of constitutive meanings, the assumptions underlying them; and secondly the ability to act in line with social rules. In short, these criteria amount to better communication.

Interpretive science, human nature and educational administration

Hermenuetic-interpretive science, like the empirical-analytic mode, provides access to a reality constituted in line with particular forms of experience and action. That is, the logical structure of interpretive knowledge is prefigured by the cognitive, knowledge–constitutive human interest in mutual understanding between members of a social group or between people in different social groups. The basis upon which knowledge is conceived is its *practical* utility in everyday life. By providing knowledge of people's intentions and interpretations of actions and situations and of the rules which govern their social interaction, hermeneutics creates the possibility of communication or else helps to overcome distortions in it. Whereas empirical-analytic science presupposes instrumental action, interpretive science involves communicative action which is

> governed by binding *consensual norms*, which define reciprocal expectations about behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in ordinary language communication. While the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations (Habermas 1971b, p. 92).

In presupposing communicative action interpretive science embodies a practical rationality concerned with promoting mutual understanding of actions, experiences, perceptions and preconceptions. From this perspective educational administration involves the establishment and maintenance of a normative basis for organisational life. When this basis exists concepts of what is worthwhile in terms of organisational objectives and experience are built into the very knowledge which is used to guide practice. Thus accountability, for example, does not mean efficiency and effectiveness achieved through action based on feedback control; instead, it involves practical choices regarding such matters as selection of curriculum content, teaching procedures, parental involvement, student organisation, standards of student behaviour and the division of labour among staff. These choices, which in practical terms take the form of everyday, accepted practices, are justified and legitimated by commitment to the moral order underlying a shared framework of meaning.

Educational administration, then, tries to enhance communication and interpersonal and intergroup understanding among all the participants in an educational institution. It seeks to make schools more responsive to the hopes people want to pin on them. These purposes require knowledge of individual and cultural values, aspirations and meanings. Knowledge of this kind can be applied to the tasks of building consensus through improved communication, analysing the qualities of educational experiences, deliberating on courses of action and making choices on the basis of established norms and precedents for acceptable practice. In drawing attention to the value commitment in the practice of educational administration, the interpretive approach (together with the critique of the fact-value separation in positivism) reveals that, from one point of view, administration is philosophy in action. As Hodgkinson remarks:

> administration is a value laden, even value-saturated enterprise. The conventional wisdom would sustain this, no practical administrator would deny it (Hodgkinson 1978, p. 122).

Interpretive science, human nature and politics

The political philosophy inherent in positivism—social engineering—refers to the use of predictive knowledge to find the best way of achieving stated values. In interpretive social science the implicit political theory is that ends and ways of attaining them are determined by establishing conditions for improved communication and mutual understanding. Therefore, the two models of social science contain different conceptions of human beings, society and politics. From the interpretive perspective people are not mere passive recipients of objective knowledge. Nor are they passive instruments whose actions are determined for them by experts. Rather, through the use of language and thought, they actively participate in the creation, maintenance and change of social life as well as interpret it. Decision making, if it is to be based on interpretive understanding, must occur within social arrangements allowing free communication between people. Interpretive social science knowledge, in enhancing communication, promotes participation and negotiation in decision making, and so advances individual and group development. As Fay comments:

> such knowledge expands the horizons of those who are now able to discourse, because learning how to communicate is learning both new ways of characterizing oneself as well as highlighting one's own presuppositions (Fay 1975, p. 81).

Earlier it was shown that empirical-analytic science cannot answer questions about the desirability of educational objectives and the quality of experience in educational organisations. It can respond only to issues of an instrumental kind. Hermeneutic-interpretive science in yielding knowledge about the values, rules and purposes underlying organisational life, overcomes this limitation by providing a normative basis for choice and decision making. It also reminds us that empirical-analytic science, and the systems of purposive-rational actions to which it gives rise, are themselves systems of social interaction and communication involving norms and shared understandings. Adherence to technical rules and the canons of objective knowledge can be guaranteed only in so far as they are institutionalised as a normative order.

Problems in the interpretive model

Nevertheless, the interpretive model of social science has shortcomings and these lead to weaknesses in its conception of the relation of theory to practice. One important inadequacy is its failure to explain the factors accounting for actions, norms and values, especially the structural aspects of social life. For instance, the realities of coping with school management and discipline, and the custom of judging schools in terms of behaviour and academic success, mean that there is little advantage, if any, in a principal allowing students and teachers any more than a consultative role (often only formal) in decision making (Hunter 1980).

Another weakness is its failure to account for possible contradictions between actions, rules and shared meanings, or between these and their consequences in people's behaviour or the factors which account for them. Thus, for example, teachers' treatment of students is by and large affected by the social class membership of those students, although teachers may not recognise this discrimination and resent any claim that it occurs (Connell et al. 1982). Again, there is a general belief that education is the great avenue of opportunity in society because it rewards ability and effort, but there is strong evidence that its effect is the

reproduction of inequality from one generation to the next (Bowles & Gintis 1976). While schools often espouse an ideology of participatory democracy, the practice usually falls well short of this (Hunter 1980).

These shortcomings are reflected in the interpretive concept of the theory-practice relationship. Firstly, this concept fails to acknowledge that certain structural conditions, such as the example above of the coping pressures faced by principals, will interfere with undistorted communication. People will be under pressure to resist the insights of interpretive social science because their existing practices are supportive of their self-concepts and enable them to meet typical demands placed upon them. Secondly, as Fay (1975) explains, the interpretive approach is inherently conservative and supportive of dominant interests served by existing structural arrangements in organisations and society, not only because it ignores conflicts of the kind mentioned above, but also because people are reconciled to their social order by the implication that tensions result from mistaken ideas they have about what other people are doing and why, rather than from 'irreconcilable demands, interests and needs' (p. 91).

Finally, we must appreciate that practical rationality, based on hermeneutic knowledge, while providing ethical bases for practical decisions, cannot address the relative worth of educational aims and experience. In fact, it implies a position of cultural relativity, one normative order being as good as another merely because it is the product of human interaction and social reality construction.

We would like you to sum up this second approach to thinking about educational administration by referring you to an article by Hunter (1980, Reading 4). This article reports the results of an interpretive analysis of the participation of teachers and students in decision making in a comprehensive secondary school. Hunter has provided an example not only of interpretive social science but also of its shortcomings, for he attempts to explain the practice of consultation, rather than sharing in decision making, with reference to structural constraints and the larger societal framework.

Reading 4

C. Hunter, 'The politics of participation with specific reference to teacher-pupil relationships', in P. Woods (ed.), *Teacher Strategies: Explorations in the Sociology of the School*, London, Croom Helm, 1980.

Activity 3.5

1. Draw out the meanings of the actions of the various participants in terms of their own intentions and interpretations and of the social rules and premises or assumptions underlying those actions. Attempt a brief explanation of these constraints.

2. Is the study relevant to your own experience?

3. What are the chief differences between the approaches of Morhman et al. (Reading 3) and Hunter to the study of participation in decision making?

4. What do you consider to be the main practical implications of these differences, not only for administrators but also for other people in schools?

Educational administration as critical practice

The nature of critical social science

Empirical-analytic knowledge is taken to be objective and consist of law-like propositions about relationships between abstract qualities of social life (e.g. morale, intelligence, pupil control ideology, organisational climate). A central objection to it is that it treats as unproblematic the social reality which is its object. That is to say, it ignores the socially constructed nature of that reality and its embodiment of values and interests, some of which may be contradictory. For this reason, it may reflect a reality which is constituted by patterns of domination supporting a structure of advantage in one form or another. To accept such knowledge as objective is to foreclose the possibility of transforming the situation and to reify authority relations which are a source of suffering for the underprivileged and prevent the manifestation in social life of values such as justice, equality and self-determination. From this point of view empirical-analytic knowledge is ideological.

Reflexive thought—in the sense that it examines its own processes and products and refuses to take them for granted—is a key feature of critical social science. This transcends the limited objective of empirical-analytic knowledge, and seeks to

> determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the critique of ideology ... [takes] into account that information about law-like connections and sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom laws are about. Thus the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws can be transformed. Of course, to this end a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render a law itself inoperative, but it can render it inapplicable (Habermas 1971a, p. 310).

What Habermas means here is that a law shown to be ideological will work in a practical sense if applied for instrumental purposes within the social order of which it is in part constitutive. On the other hand, it would be inapplicable to practical activity that is based on critical social science, and which aims at liberating change. Examples of ideologically based 'law-like connections' are those uncovered by Mohrman et al. (1978) on the connections between degree of participation by teachers in technical domain decisions and level of work satisfaction, and their belief that they should have significantly more participation in technical than in managerial concerns. These relationships are ideological because, in the first place, the research which produced them takes for granted the meaning of participation both as the teachers perceive it and with respect to the form it actually takes in the organisations concerned. In the second place, Mohrman et al. not only ignore the historical and social meaning of the development of large bureaucratic organisations as instruments of control in the economy and the state; they also ignore the contradiction between the structural characteristics of these organisations, which are oriented towards order and control, and creative participation in decision making by lower order members (e.g. teachers) whose conformity is required. Thirdly, no attention is given to the possibility of the acceptance by teachers of an ideology of participation and its use by administrators as an instrument of control. For an elaboration of this point see Hunter (1980, Reading 4).

The critique of instrumental rationality, which is pre-supposed in empirical-analytic science, is another instance of the application of a

critical social science. As we have seen, this form of rationality fallaciously separates means from ends, technologises politics and decision making, and, in affecting more and more aspects of social life, suppresses other forms of rationality and acts as a potent legitimating force by bestowing moral significance on the norms of efficiency and control. Apple (1975), an American who has been concerned with the development of a critical theory of curriculum and education, argues that the basis of many oppressive features of schooling in advanced industrial societies lies in

> the models and language systems that are applied in designing educative environments and ... in a large portion of educational research ... [and] in a fundamental ethic that all important modes of human action can be known in advance by educators and social scientists; that certainty in interaction among people is of primary import; and, underlying all of these, that the primary aspects of thought and sentiment of students should be brought under institutionalised control (Apple 1975, p. 120).

The nature of critical social science is also illustrated in the critique of hermeneutic-interpretive science. Hermeneutic-interpretive science can draw attention to distorted patterns of communication in institutions, but its problematic has several limitations. It cannot address sources of distortion, firstly, in the history of institutions; secondly, in the relationships between social structure and the ideas of people; and thirdly, in contradictions involving actions, norms and meanings, their causes and consequences, and their different structural locations in organisations and society. Interpretive science is also unable to provide a basis for judgments between competing normative traditions. Critical social science is able to transcend these limitations because it seeks to lay bare the conditions for undistorted communication and provides a methodology for justifying norms.

Habermas (1971) argues that these are present in an ideal speech situation. Every speaker of a language possesses communicative competence, and is for this reason able to discern when true consensus exists. In an ideal communication situation the norms and expectations governing social relations are such that the participants are not subject to repressive dominance or inequality. Mutual understanding is possible where people comprehend one another, agree on a factual basis for discussion, are truthful to one another and make utterances which are right, given the context in which they are made (Foster 1980b). These norms are possible, and promote community consensus free from delusions or distortions, in a situation of unforced, democratic communication. Thus a political philosophy of participative democracy underlies critical social science. The ideal speech situation is an abstraction, but it serves as an ideal which, by providing a basis for comparison, can reveal hidden patterns of distorted communication and the repressive social structures underlying them. A relevant example here is the contradiction between the rhetoric and the reality of participation in decision making in schools.

The characteristics of ideal communication provide the conditions for creating and justifying norms and social institutions. This involves an emancipatory concept of truth:

> Truth is recognized in the deliberative rationality of formulating norms, roles and knowledge about possible ways of life – ways undistorted by repressive forms of authority, privilege and vested interests of exploitation. Truth as social wisdom acquires the meaning of justice, the possibility for happiness and the undistorted life forms in the practical art of living (Van Manen 1977, p. 222).

The critiques of empirical-analytic and interpretive science, then, are critical social science in action, because these critiques draw attention to its chief characteristics. Clearly, critical social science utilises both empirical-analytic and interpretive social science knowledge, but through self-reflection and critique transcends their interests in control and mutual understanding respectively, and incorporates them within an interest in emancipation. Theories are seen as analyses of situations with two purposes in mind: one is to uncover the sources of frustration, repression, unmet needs and distorted communication experienced by a group; the other is to identify the possibilities for change which will bring about the social conditions necessary for self-understanding, critical consciousness and self-determination. Thus, the commitment to practice is built into theory because this is constructed with a view to emancipation. Practice then becomes praxis, for it is based on conscious reflection. Freire (1970) calls this process 'conscientization', in which people become aware of how the social order shapes their lives and of their ability to transform it. The method of getting knowledge is self-reflection, a process in which people inquire into how and why they have come to have their ideas about society and their places in it. The role of the critical social scientist is to uncover and articulate repression and dissatisfaction. Theories produced are not a basis for manipulation, firstly because their truth is partly dependent on whether the people concerned accept them as valid interpretations of their situation; and secondly because it is only the people affected by a theory who can judge its effectiveness.

Finally, we must draw attention to three important aspects of critical social science which arise as a result of the knowledge-constitutive interest in emancipation which underlies it. One is that it develops historical accounts which show how people come to have needs and purposes which are unfulfilled. For instance, the current troubles of educational administrators could be explained by relating them to the emergence in advanced capitalist societies of crisis situations which are grounded in their socio-economic relations (Foster 1980b). Secondly, critical social science shows how contradictions in social life underly the conflict and tension experienced by people. Contradictions refer to inconsistencies and incompatibilities in the structure of social life. An example of this is the contradiction between bureaucracy and participation and the repression and tensions this can lead to in schools (Hunter 1980). Thirdly, there is ideology-critique. Earlier we saw that an ideology is a belief and value system, and accompanying social practices, which are held to be true and valid, shape a group's behaviour and interpretation of reality and justify and legitimate their actions and position in the social order. The critical perspective tries to show how ideology distorts social, moral and political reality and veils the sources of conflict, repression and dissatisfaction, and commits people to a reified set of norms and power relations. An example which affects administration is a technocratic ideology which reduces decision making to a technical activity, removes it from political and moral discourse and protects the interests best served by administrative systems.

Critical theory and educational administration

From the point of view of critical theory, educational administration has an explicit, unashamed value orientation. There cannot be objective understanding and explanation of social phenomena in the value-neutral

sense. The educational administrator tries to understand the society in which he works, not from the point of view of control or system maintenance, but with a view to realising values of social justice, self-determination, equality of opportunity, freedom from repressive authority, authenticity in social relations and community well being.

The administrator, therefore, bases his or her practice on an understanding of the factors working against the realisation of these values. An important purpose is the *demystification* of social structures, processes and ideologies; that is, helping people understand whether their legitimate interests are adequately being served by the existing social order. Because they are caught up in administrative hierarchies, administrators need to be vigilant lest they are drawn into an ideological role—that is, act for repressive forms of authority in that they help to present the world in a light favourable to groups best served by those forms of authority. They strive constantly to reveal loci of power and the sources of pain and suffering which these loci conceal. They try to understand why schools as they are presently constituted continue to be associated with inequality of opportunity.

Administrative practice is grounded in an expanded rationality involving interpretive understanding and ethical discussion. It is compatible with Freire's (1970) view of education as the practice of freedom, the means by which people participate in the transformation of their world. Schools as organisations are designed so that they become consensus-seeking communities, free of distorted communication and realising participatory democracy.

Administrators oriented to a critical practice seek demystification of their own roles and functions in the education system as members of an historically situated occupational group. Complementing this task is the administrator's location of himself or herself as an individual within the social structure, and consequent understanding of how his or her personal and professional biography is shaped by the history of the society and of the education system in it.

A critical approach places the administrator in a better position to:

1. Interpret the meanings which social situations, events and trends have for the lives of students, teachers and communities
2. Develop a theory of learning and teaching adequate in its sociological aspects and emancipatory in intent
3. Discover what in social and political terms it is possible for schools to achieve
4. Unearth sources of domination in the functioning of the education system and its connections with other institutions
5. Assess and modify educational policies and to formulate new ones on the basis of their emancipatory promise

Critical theory—some reservations

Critical social science, it must be said, is not without its critics. One important charge concerns theory and practice. Any group in society could be said to have subjective dissatisfactions. How and why, for what reasons and what justification should a critical social scientist help one group develop a praxis rather than another? What if assisting one group should lead to dissatisfactions and frustrations for another? A second problem is that the values in critical theory are often difficult to bring down to a practical level. For example, how should it be decided whether

the homosexual point of view should be put in schools? Thirdly, there is a view that in spite of its attempt to base normative construction and justification within a structure permitting undistorted communication, this is no guarantee that a universally accepted, humanly generic ethical system will emerge. That is, critical theory (like hermeneutics) could be said to lead logically to cultural relativism. This point is reinforced by the emphasis in critical theory on the historical specificity of dissatisfactions and perceptions of needs and interests.

Reading 5
W. P. Foster, 'Administration and the crisis in legitimacy: A review of Habermasian thought', *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1980, pp. 496–505.

Activity 3.6
Note how Habermas' work illustrates the concern of critical social science with historical explanation, contradiction in social life and ideology-critique.

1. How does Habermas' theory link modern administrative theory, crisis tendencies in modern capitalist societies and educational problems?

2. Bearing in mind that in critical social science the satisfaction of human needs and purposes (i.e. a particular political philosophy) is built into theory, what are the implications of Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis for practice in educational administration?

Conclusion

The practice of educational administration is becoming more complex and demanding. There is an accompanying ferment and diversity in the study of educational administration. These developments raise important questions. How is the administrator to decide what is worthwhile in the face of debate and disagreement? How is practical use to be made of knowledge available to administrators? In what ways can the practice of educational administration be conceptualised, and how should these be interpreted?

Answers to these questions have been developed by a critical application of the three main traditions of science and rationality. These are the:

1. empirical-analytic
2. hermeneutic-interpretive
3. critical

Each incorporates a philosophy of knowledge and a concept of the practical, and from them concepts of educational administration can be derived. Thus empirical-analytic rationality implies administration as effective control in a technical managerial sense; the hermeneutic-interpretive suggests a concept involving the promotion of intersubjective communication and understanding; and the critical is consistent with a concept of administration as the development of conditions for self-understanding, critical consciousness and self-determination.

However, rationalities also have social, political and ideological dimensions. Therefore, the task of deciding what is worthwhile and justifiable practice in educational administration (and in any 'human

understanding of educational institutions. For this reason, many still see a place for approaches such as theory of bureaucracy and social systems theories as discussed in Hoy & Miskel (1982, Chapters 3 and 4). Sergiovanni et al. (1980, Chapter 2) also review a variety of theories in their sketch of the development of thought in educational administration. In another example Willower says:

> Garbage can theory stresses the dynamic aspects of organizational life and especially of decision making, but neglects the more stable, less anarchical features. Social system theories emphasize structural elements like norms, status arrangements and socialization mechanisms that govern life in collectivities, but gloss over individual differences (Willower 1981, p. 131).

Sergiovanni et al. (1980, p. 96) stress 'the utility of contingency theory as a metaframework for organising research and reflection about educational administration', but warn that it is not the only valid way to understand administration and has the disadvantage of producing knowledge about organisations which suggest workable, but not necessarily appropriate, solutions to problems.

Disputes in the debate between the supporters of the competing perspectives derive from the initial choice of a working paradigm which from the beginning determines meanings, rules and approaches. The essential nature of the concept 'paradigm' is clarified by Ritzer's definition.

> A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or *subcommunity*) from another. It subsumes, defines and interrelates the exemplars [generally recognised scientific achievements] theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it (Ritzer 1975, p. 7).

Within the phenomenological and critical perspectives the concepts of social theory and social science have meanings different from those in the dominant paradigm. These different perspectives of social theory and social science underly the controversy and debate which have arisen between proponents of each approach. Defences of the dominant paradigm are to be found in Griffiths (1977, 1979); Hills (1980); Hoy (1978) and Willower (1979, 1980, 1981). Criticism of it is to be found in Greenfield (1975, 1978, 1980) whose attack is based on phenomenology, and Bates (1980b, 1982) and Foster (1980) who adopt a critical perspective.

Traditionalists claim that valid knowledge about organisations is objective and that care must be taken that it is not distorted by the values and beliefs of the researcher. They assert that knowledge claims must be backed up by public evidence. The challengers argue that social life is the creation of people who express and pursue values, intentions and interests, and that facts cannot be separated from values. Knowledge is based on and informed by empathy, intuition, introspection and reflection. Traditionalists conceive theory as propositions developed from axioms (e.g. those of systems theory or the loose coupling model) concerning social life, provisionally verified by 'the facts' as they are currently known. For phenomenologists, theory refers to sets of meanings which provide understanding of people's actions and interpretations of organisational life. They criticise traditional theory as ideological because it ignores the values and interests which constitute

social reality. By treating this reality as objective and absolute, traditional theory implicitly supports existing social arrangements and the position in them of dominant interests. Traditionalists retort that phenomenological and critical theories (including Marxist approaches) are ideological because they are based on mere commitment and dogma, rather than the disinterested pursuit of objective knowledge through free inquiry, creativity and the public testing of ideas. Traditionalists see practice in educational administration as the use of explanations of social life, of theory, to achieve desired outcomes. Training should focus on up-to-date theories and the administrative and leadership skills which they imply. Phenomenologists warn that prescriptive theory and technique will at the least leave problems unsolved and at the worst exacerbate them. Training should be concerned with the critical and reflective study of specific organisations and the difficulties faced by people within them. Also advisable is experience of widely contrasting organisational realities in order to deepen insights into the complexity, ambiguity and human (as opposed to systemic) qualities of social life. Critical approaches point, among other things, to the role of administration in the production of culture and meanings which are dominant in a school, and the need for a critical administrator to reflect on such production, relating it to patterns of domination and to the achievement of justice, autonomy and freedom from oppression of various kinds (Bates 1982).

Theory, practice and practitioners

The nature of the relationship between theory and practice, and its expression in training programs, is an issue for practitioners. Frequently there is a tendency for theory to be devalued because it is seen to have little import for effective and satisfying practice. Courses are perceived as divided into units based on the structure of theoretical knowledge, not on the problems and functional areas of practice. Practitioners want to develop skills and knowledge of practical relevance to the typical situations, problems and tasks with which they must cope. This requirement has led to a call by practitioners for more control over their learning in formal courses in educational administration (South Australian Institute for Educational Administration 1980).

It must be asked to what extent these complaints are related to disagreements about the nature of organisational reality and of valid knowledge about it, and about how this knowledge can and should affect 'how one lives' in educational institutions, especially if he or she is an administrator. In responding to criticism about the relevance of theory for practice, traditionalists might speculate that theory is not in tune with the times, or that it is based on inadequate research. Further, they might argue that theory is insufficiently developed to predict the consequences and therefore the desirability of particular lines of action; or that there has been poor translation of theory into strategies and programs.

Phenomenologists might claim that the practice based on knowledge and theory produced within the dominant paradigm will reflect the values and interests of individuals and groups which have the power to impose their meanings and intentions on others. This will create rather than solve problems for the administrator because such practice can contribute little to the development and maintenance of effective and responsive institutions which serve the interests of most of their constituents and which result in people feeling they are able to lead the lives they wish to

lead and that their problems have been diminished. From the critical perspective a further charge might be that the ideal of objective knowledge in the dominant paradigm tends to promote the belief that the scientific method can first reveal the tasks and competencies required of educational administrators and also yield objective, culture-free knowledge of organisations and behaviour which can be applied to the production of the most efficient and effective management techniques. Thus, questions of organisational and administrative values and ethics are minimised. The beliefs and values implicit in the view that administration can rest purely on an objective, neutral science, and their implications for the nature of education and of the individual, are left unexamined. Technology (which really amounts to preferred ways of doing things) is given the status of science and its value dimension thereby hidden (Gouldner 1976).

Activity 3.3
Briefly write down what you expect to get from a course of study in educational administration. What kind of practical assistance should such a course provide?

Issues for resolution

Let us pause and review the argument so far. A number of interlocking socio-economic, political and educational changes have resulted in the practice of educational administration becoming more demanding and complex. These changes have been accompanied by ferment in the study of educational administration. A diversity of new explanatory models has appeared; there is a keener awareness of, and interest in, the philosophical foundations of educational administration; and controversy and debate have arisen over some recent contributions to theory. Most attempts to reformulate models of educational institutions and their management and administration retain traditional concepts of social theory and social science. Phenomenological and critical approaches, however, adopt different paradigms, and this is the basis of the controversies which involve those we have called the traditionalists on one side and proponents of the emergent approaches on the other. Disagreements mainly centre on epistemological issues, on the nature of theory, on the ideological import of competing theories, and consequently, on the nature of practice in educational administration and of appropriate training for it. In other words, the central issues relate to the nature of valid inquiry and verification of knowledge, of objectivity and subjectivity along with the relationship between abstract principle and concrete fact.

Adherence to one paradigm or another influences how one views organisational reality, administrative problems and valid administrative practice. This point has been illustrated by speculating on how proponents of each paradigm might interpret complaints from practitioners that theory in educational administration has little relevance to their work.

Thus, issues in the practice of educational administration are reflected in increasing doubts and disagreement about the adequacy and appropriateness of currently dominant theory and its relationship with practice. Suggested here are three important sets of questions which

should be addressed, and if possible resolved, both by administrators and the administered in educational organisations. These questions are:

1. How is sense to be made of the controversies over theory and research in educational administration? How is the practitioner to decide what is worthwhile?

2. How is the theoretical knowledge, provided in part by research in educational administration, to be translated into administrative action, organisational and administrative forms and educational policy making? How are administrators to make practical use of the knowledge available to them?

3. In what ways can educational administration be conceptualised? Are these conceptualisations complementary or incompatible? Are they underpinned by different value orientations?

These questions can be addressed by analysing the controversies in educational administration with reference to the three broad traditions of social science. In fact, these traditions parallel the traditional, phenomenological and critical approaches in educational administration, and we have therefore already drawn attention to some of their key features. Each tradition incorporates a philosophy of knowledge, a concept of the practical and ethical, ideological and political dimensions. Each can also be used to formulate a concept of educational administration. We will explain, illustrate and critically react to each one in turn.

Technical rationality in educational administration

Empirical-analytic science and positivism

Traditional approaches are based on empirical-analytic science (Habermas 1971; Popkewitz 1980). Sometimes this is referred to as positivism or logical positivism (Fay 1975; Culbertson 1981). Knowledge of social reality is seen to be objective, 'a neutral picturing of fact' (Schroyer 1970), having an existence separate from the beliefs and attitudes of the knowing subjects. It takes the form of causal relationships between the analytically separable events and properties of social systems.

Theory, the fundamental purpose of which is to describe and explain the social world, is therefore hypothetico-deductive in nature, comprising a 'set of assumptions' (e.g. those based on systems theory or contingency theory 'from which propositions can be deduced by mathematical or logical reasoning' [Griffiths 1978, p. 82]). These propositions are empirically tested in publicly verifiable ways using as operating guides the norms and procedures of the physical sciences involving quantification where possible. Science is dynamic and cumulative, for experimentation and observation result in the ongoing falsification and confirmation of propositions and the generation of new ones. The criterion of truth is whether a statement corresponds with the facts as empirically determined. Causation is taken to be linear; there is a one-way direction of influence from independent to dependent variable.

Now, empirical-analytical science is on the whole positivist in orientation (Habermas 1971; Schroyer 1970). What this means firstly, is, that science is taken to be an inherently neutral and abstract system, not influenced to any degree by values or social and political interests. Secondly, it means that science is identified with knowledge based on

empirically verified fact. Thus, the knowledge produced by science is neutral and describes what exists. It does not and cannot justify values or indicate what 'ought to be'. There is a separation, in other words, between theory and practice. How people use theory depends upon their values and political interests. Scientific knowledge is applied to develop and produce weaponry of enormous destructive potential. Principles of behavioural science are used to manipulate public taste. Nevertheless, from the point of view of positivistic science, the reason for this lies in the use to which neutral scientific knowledge is put, not in any of its constitutive elements.

Technical control and administrative practice

The logical structure of empirical-analytic science, comprising hypothetico-deductive systems and causal patterns, means that reality is constituted in line with particular forms of experience and action: namely, prediction and the manipulation of elements in social life. That is, the basis upon which valid knowledge is conceived is its technical utility. By revealing causal connections between variables, science provides information which makes possible the control of the outcomes of action; the bringing about or prevention of a particular state of affairs by feedback-monitored action. As Fay says:

> the possibility of technical control, far from having a contingent relation to science, is indeed part of the framework which constitutes the very possibility of scientific activity (p. 39) ... we understand a state of affairs scientifically only to the extent that we have the knowledge of what to do in order to control it (p. 40) ... because science marks out the 'world' as a world of observable phenomena subject to general laws it thereby is constituting this 'world' from the viewpoint of how one can gain control over it (p. 40) ... it is its (instrumental) conception of the relation of theory to practice that gives the scientific conception of truth its meaning and therefore sets the conditions for the validity of a scientific explanation (Fay 1975, p. 43).

Inherent in science are instrumental or purposive-rational forms of action—that is, a technical rationality concerned with choices between alternative means and control over them. This aspect underlies, for example, the 'systems approach' to educational management. Data on the relationship between inputs and outputs are obtained using the canons of science. The feedback obtained indicates whether results are in line with system needs and functions, and can be used to justify changes which will have consequences for the lives of teachers, students and others in the system.

Empirical-analytic science, then, cannot provide guidance on how worthwhile organisational objectives are, or the quality of experience in educational institutions. The manner in which this science constitutes action and experience places constraints on administrators such that they think in terms of instrumental questions. Administrative arrangements, policies and modes of organisation are monitored and, if need be, rationalised from the point of view of their functional relationship with such concerns as student behaviour, learning outcomes, teacher morale and effectiveness, and the nature and extent of parental involvement. Knowledge informs practice in the sense that administrative techniques and strategies are based on principles derived from propositional theory rooted in research. Training programs for administrators with a focus on technical rationality are competency based, the emphasis being on the mastery of a range of techniques which will allow the efficient and effective attainment of organisational goals. Thus empirical-analytic

science and rationality imply a concept of administration as effective control in the technical and managerial sense.

We have seen that empirical-analytic science in the positivist tradition holds that knowledge is inherently neutral. Technically useful knowledge and purposive rational procedures are equated with theoretical knowledge, scientific method and rationality, and are therefore not seen as values or as desirable and preferred ways of prefiguring social reality and of acting upon it. At the least they are not seen as values requiring justification. They are taken as given, as absolute, as the way things are 'naturally'. Thus, for example, educational administrators, in using systems analysis or behavioural science-based techniques to realise the framework of values and aims set for their institutions, are acting in value-neutral ways by adhering to principles of instrumental efficiency and effectiveness. Given true knowledge of the world as revealed through science, this is the right and proper mode of action. Basing action on values along with subjective meanings and interpretations is inappropriate, for it is only by adopting 'the mature stance of neutrality vis-a-vis one's social world, [and studying] its workings as they are and not how one wishes them to be' that one can reveal as they are the 'mechanisms which determine this social world' (Fay 1975, p. 20).

Scientism and technocratic ideology

The logic of positivism leads to scientism, the view that empirical-analytic science is the only source of true knowledge about man and society. The correlative of scientism is not so much a technical rationality as a technocratic ideology. It is an ideology in two senses. Firstly, it forms the set of beliefs and assumptions with which people make sense of, organise and act upon their everyday experience. Technocratic consciousness is reflected in everyday speech through the use of such terms as input, output, system, feedback, functional, accountability, and data base. Secondly, it is ideological in the sense that in dictating that management and organisation be based upon rational efficiency and scientific principles and methodology, it construes decision making as a technical problem requiring information and instrumental strategies produced by technical experts thus removing decision making from political debate. This means that discussion of values is repressed and that, for example, the interests best served by administrative systems are hidden. Positivism, in postulating the neutrality of knowledge, renders meaningless within its own presuppositions the asking of questions about ethical or ideological dimensions of science and rationality.

Science and human interests

If, however, empirical-analytic science is understood as the product of people, of concrete social interaction, then there are two ways in which it can be seen as constituting values and interests. Firstly, we can draw on the theory of knowledge, human interests and action developed by Jurgen Habermas (1971a), a German philosopher-sociologist. He postulates what may be termed three generic human interests which are grounded in the three basic aspects of social existence.

1. Work, referring to the interest people have in manipulating and controlling their environment
2. Symbolic interaction, which concerns the practical interest in communicative action and mutual understanding

3. Power and authority, which leads to people having an interest in emancipation from unnecessarily limiting structures of domination

Each interest is cognitive and knowledge-constitutive, for the system of action upon which it is based gives rise to the need for a particular way of understanding, and acting upon, reality. These interests determine what is taken to be knowledge, valid ways of obtaining that knowledge, and the criteria for assessing knowledge claims. Processes of everyday life within the systems of action are the basis for the three modes of scientific inquiry, each one presupposing a human interest and requiring a different model of explanation. Thus empirical-analytical science, although it assumes neutrality in its form, 'is actually an inquiry which has the theoretical [i.e. cognitive, human] interest and societal consequence of maintaining technical control' (Shroyer 1970, p. 215). Symbolic interaction systems and systems of power and authority are the basis of interests which prefigure hermeneutic-interpretive and critical social sciences, respectively.

Conceiving science as a social construction requires that it be treated as problematic, that the presuppositions both of positivism and of empirical-analytical science be transcended—positivism because it cannot entertain the possibility of science being constituted by values and interests; and empirical-analytic science because it lacks the concepts, theories and methods to understand its own genesis and nature as a system of human interaction and communication involving norms, intentions, intersubjective meanings and shared understandings. For this a different form of knowledge and mode of inquiry is necessary—hermeneutic-interpretive science, of which phenomenology is part.

Science, values and political practice

There is a second way in which values can be seen as a constitutive element of empirical-analytic science. The conception of the relation between theory and practice which is built into it—namely technical control—amounts to a political philosophy when applied in the context of social life (Fay 1975). What this means is that decisions relating to the distribution of resources, values and positions in society—about the kinds of lives that people should lead—ought to be based upon the application of social scientific knowledge, not upon factors such as rhetoric, power, status, wealth, persuasion and compromise. At least with respect to instrumental issues (concerned with the maximisation of accepted values), arguments should not be expressed in terms of personal values and preferences and self-interest; rather, there should be a rational application of data and technique to discover the best means of dealing with a problem within the confines of its objectively known parameters. Decision making concerning instrumental matters should be in the hands of qualified experts accountable to their peers, not to a public ignorant of technical matters.

> Implicit in this belief that an applied science can perform the tasks now seen as political is the tacit presumption that science provides the paradigm example of proper thinking, and that as long as any human enterprise is not treated in a scientific way it is being treated in an imperfect way. It is this viewpoint which underlies the single most important element in the whole social engineering view of politics, which is that there is a *correct* way of proceeding in human affairs and that it is the responsibility of the decision-maker to discover what this way is (Fay 1975, p. 28).

Administrative practice, then, in the form of technical control, is a political practice, determining such matters as the distribution of

resources, the organisation of teaching and the mode of curriculum development. The educational administrator, from this point of view, is a social systems engineer.

Science, politics and administration

To summarise, empirical-analytic social science involves a separation of facts and values. It is concerned only with what is, and this can be known objectively. Therefore, it cannot provide guidance on the ends which ought to be sought, but only the best means to achieve values already determined. Theory is considered to be separate from practice in the sense that the use made of theory is not affected by anything in the nature of that theory. Knowledge of social life is claimed to be neutral. Two main objections to this position have been developed. The first is that a specific kind of practice, technical and managerial control, is a necessary consequence of acting in accordance with the type of knowledge produced by empirical-analytic science. Secondly, there is a case that interests and values are constitutive elements of this type of knowledge. In fact, not only is it necessarily related to generic human interests but also to a social engineering or technological view of politics. The advantages claimed for this view are twofold. In the first place it can provide the technically best means of action (given the current state of relevant knowledge and the nature of the problem as it is known) no matter what the ends of the person adopting it are. The second advantage is that policy decisions are impartial because they are based in knowledge, the truth of which is independent of the values of those who make the decisions. Given that positivist science entails a particular political philosophy, what are the main values in this philosophy and can any objections be raised to them?

Responding to this question requires first of all the observation that positivist science and the technical control concept of the relation between theory and practice are associated with the development of industrial society. Their institutionalisation arose in the context of the spread of technical rationalisation from the economic to more and more spheres of social life. This process supports the continued expansion of productive forces, not only from the point of view of the natural sciences applied to the development of new techniques and products, but also of the social sciences and their potential for improving the administration and organisation of production and other institutions directly supportive of it such as a trade, communications and the education system. This process has now permeated political life, and there is a symbiotic link between science, the economy and the state. The main reason for progressively larger increases in state intervention has been the inherent instability of the industrial system when left to itself. The tendency has been for the values of industrialism and economic growth to be accepted and for politics to be seen as essentially a technical matter concerned chiefly with:

> [maintaining] stabilizing conditions for an economy that guards against risks to growth and guarantees social security and the chance for individual upward mobility ... politics ... is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward *the realization of practical goals* but toward the *solution of technical problems* (Habermas 1971b, pp. 102–3).

Therefore, positivist social science and social engineering reinforce the values of industrialism and in particular a concept of people and social systems as instruments rather than as ends in themselves.

This point can be taken further and illustrated with reference to the view of a top administrator in a state education department:

> Education is a professional skill and running an education system, in other words educational administration, whether on a state-wide or even an individual school basis, is of the nature of an applied science. Preserving the concept of 'skill', then involves the Department in some procedures that cut across the ideas of some teachers on what is democratic (Barter, 1972, p. 2).

Clearly a positivist approach to politics underlies this statement. It is implied that a system of hierarchical control is necessary in a technical sense in order to permit the exercise of administrative skill required to run an education system. We need to note that this view depoliticises administration, turning it into a neutral, technical instrument, and suggesting that the 'correct' way to achieve ends can be determined in an objective, scientific manner, without reference to values and philosophy. This is a fundamental error underlying the positivist model of social science, and the nature of the relation between theory and practice and of the political philosophy underlying it. Means embody values. For example, controversy over different teaching methods, although often couched purely in terms of relative efficiency in promoting learning, is also importantly about value choice—about the nature of people and the principles in accordance with which their lives should be conducted. But even the criterion for the optimum technical solution—efficiency—must be specified in terms of practical meaning. As Fay points out:

> if a policy scientist [e.g., an educational administrator] were to advocate the adoption of the most efficient means to a given end, one would be forced to inquire, efficient in terms of what—monetary cost? human labour? suffering? the consumption of natural fuels? time? or what? (Fay 1975, p. 50)

Science and human nature

We must also note that justifying hierarchy of control in technical terms entails commitment to a form of political and organisational life which is rooted in a particular conception of human needs, purposes, abilities and worth. It involves an authoritarian system and the imposition of decisions on people who are viewed as passive instruments. Fay (1975, p. 54) reviews another theory of politics in which not only the objectives but also the process of decision making is seen to be important. It is argued that people are self-conscious, autonomous beings, able to reflect on their lives and social arrangements and to create new forms of action and experience. Social interaction, including political activity, is a developmental educative process of individual and social formation, involving the determination of individual and collective identities. How people see their own natures is a function of their social lives.

> Men [sic] can be free only when they participate in determining the conditions of their lives, and are not simply subject to the commands of others: for to be deprived of the opportunities for political participation is to lose the chance to exercise one's powers of self-reflection, and, as a result, to lose the essential human capacity of self-determination with regard to some of the most important areas of our existence; and one can be free only when one is self-determining (Fay 1975, p. 54).

Positivism and the status quo

Social engineering, then, or technical politics, reinforces the values of industrial society, and in particular those of economic rationality and an instrumental conception of people. There is another way in which it legitimates industrial society. Positivist social science, the basis of social engineering, is concerned with the understanding only of what is, and

not what could or should be. For this reason it necessarily reifies existing social arrangements. Therefore, decision making and administration within a technical mode of practice, in treating these arrangements as unproblematic and the relationships which govern them as natural, incorporates an ideological bias in favour of the status quo. Consider the area of personnel policy. Mainstream management science includes propositions about worker satisfaction and productivity. Satisfied workers tend to be more productive. Factors such as degree of autonomy, skill level and range and variety of tasks affect levels of satisfaction. Relationships of this kind are taken as indicative of ways in which problems such as low morale among workers can be solved. But they are also taken to reveal how work organisations naturally and necessarily function. This means that the laws governing relationships within these organisations become the unexamined dimensions within which problems must be treated. The result is confirmation of certain structural features of organisations in industrial, capitalist society.

Finally, we can note that decision making based on a positivist social science supports dominant groups in society and its organisations for two reasons. One is that it is normally the powerful who have the resources to manipulate variables in ways indicated by analysis based on technical rationality. A second reason is that the ascendency in industrial society of technical decision making creates the impression that basic social relations are objectively necessary and, consequently, that existing patterns of domination are required rather than merely conventional.

Conclusions

From the discussion so far, several conclusions can be drawn.

1. Firstly, the positivist model of social science is conceptually tied to a particular political philosophy—social engineering. Fay calls this a 'policy science' which refers to 'that set of procedures which enables one to determine the technically best course of action to adopt in order to implement a decision or achieve a goal'; to find 'the most technically correct answer to political problems in terms of available social scientific knowledge' (Fay 1975, p. 14). We have been able to show that positivist social science, through its connection with policy science, is inherently ideological, and this also applies to a concept of practice in educational administration which is based on technical and managerial control. Indeed, positivism embodies conceptions of human nature, society and politics, and these necessarily arise out of its criteria for truth and knowledge, which concern the validity of predictive knowledge and therefore the possibility of instrumental control.

Nevertheless, inherent ideological content does not mean that positivist social science is fallacious. To say that it is in error because it reinforces the values of industrial society and legitimates organisations as they are now constituted would be simply to assert that a particular set of social values and political preferences are wrong. As Fay comments: 'this would be like arguing that evolution is wrong because it leads to a decline in trust of the Bible' (1975, p. 14).

2. There is in positivism however a fallacious view of the relation between facts and values. One indication of this is that it is in part constituted by the cognitive human interest in technical control and the values implicit in a social engineering view of politics and decision making. Another indication, developed in analytical philosophy, is that social reality can only be described in terms of institutional facts, which

profession') must consider the following points concerning modes of rationality and associated concepts of administration:

1. They are socially produced and legitimated, and they both condition and are conditioned by our experiences
2. They make experience intelligible
3. Each one is associated with a set of interests which mediate views of the world
4. Each stands in a particular relationship with the dominant rationality in a society at a particular time, and so is ideological in the sense that it justifies and legitimates one assessment of existing social relations rather than another
5. Inherent in each is a political philosophy and therefore a view of the good life
6. They differ in their problematics and therefore in the limits of their responses and social issues and conflicts

It is clear, then, that there are interconnections between the norms and rules of particular forms of science, rationality and of knowledge, and their social, political and ideological contexts. For this reason, drawing distinctions between fact and value, theory and practice, description and prescriptions, and so on, may distort both the study of educational administration and its practice. Choices between modes of administrative praxis are at least in part political and ethical in nature. That is to say, an adequate theory of educational administration, and its valid practice, must be rooted in political and ethical discourse. Educational administration is both politics in action and philosophy in action. It should be realised that all forms of rationality can produce practically useful knowledge. The validity of this knowledge must be determined by critical reflection on prevailing social and political conditions and ethical issues.

Our suggestion has been that critical social science utilises empirical-analytic and interpretive knowledge, but transcends the interests of both and incorporates them within an interest in emancipation.

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SECTION 4
THE ADMINISTRATOR AS MANAGER

Peter Watkins

'Captain Matthew Flinders Memorial', bronze, 1923-25, Melbourne City Council, Swanston Street, Melbourne.

THE ADMINISTRATOR AS MANAGER

Peter Watkins

Introduction

The previous section argued that the practice of educational administration should be directed towards an emancipatory interest rather than used as a technique of control. To achieve this it was suggested that a critical social practice would demystify the dominant social structures, processes and ideologies.

This section examines how educational administration became essentially a technique of control through the transfer of scientific management practices and ideologies from industrial management to school management. It argues that the influence of scientific management is still the dominant force in the administration of schools; but that such an influence presents organisational problems as technical problems and ignores the power relationship, class structure and legitimating ideologies around which organisations are structured.

Scientific management

Although Frederick Winslow Taylor did not formulate the term 'scientific management' which was originally put forward by Louis Brandeis during a railroad dispute, it has become unquestionably identified with him. In administration literature the terms 'Taylorism' and 'scientific management' have become synonymous.

The system of management which Taylor eventually arrived at developed during the industrial unrest at Midvale Steel. It was based on the assumption that people will realise what is best for them economically and act accordingly. As Taylor argued:

> what the workmen want from their employers beyond anything else is *high wages* and what employers want from their workmen most of all is *low labour cost* of manufacture ... the existence or absence of these two elements forms the best index to either good or bad management (Taylor 1972a, p. 93).

So that this rational behaviour could eventuate Taylor proposed four types of new duties which he called the 'principles of scientific management'.

> The first of these principles may be called the development of a science of work.
> The second is the scientific selection and then progressive development of the workmen.
> The third is the bringing of the science and the scientifically selected and trained workmen together.
> The fourth consists of an almost equal division of the actual work of the establishment between the workmen, on the one hand, and the management on the other hand (Taylor 1972b, pp. 40–41).

Taylor advocated this 'one best way' of doing work, because he considered that workers were deliberately restricting the level of production required by management. Such behaviour while rational to the workers was irrational to management and their representatives like Taylor. So 'scientific management' was 'initiated' to squeeze a greater amount of actual production out of the employers' labour power or

potential labour, thereby raising the rate of surplus value available to management. The solution of how to intensify the labour process was to change the organisation of work. For Taylor noted under prevailing conditions the workers controlled the work process. As he pointed out:

> the underlying philosophy of all of the old systems of management in common use makes it imperative that each workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his job practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice from management (Taylor 1972a, p. 25).

Thus for the structure of work to alter,

> the management must take over and perform much of the work which is now left to the men; almost every act of the workman should be preceded by one or more preparatory acts of the management (Taylor 1972a, p. 26).

Scientific management is concerned with management's point of view. It does not concern itself with the underlying reasons for the development of antagonistic social relations of work. It is concerned with the shaping and structuring of labour to the needs of capital. As Braverman (1974) states it is not so much a science of management as is commonly presented but rather 'a science of the management of other's work under capitalist conditions' (p. 90).
Braverman views Taylorism in terms of three major principles:

> The *dissociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers* ... Henceforth it is to depend not at all upon the abilities of workers, but entirely upon the practices of management (p. 113).
>
> The *separation of conception from execution*, rather than its more common name of the separation of mental and manual labor ... [the] 'science of work' is never to be developed by the worker, always by management (p. 114).
>
> If the first principle is the gathering and development of knowledge of labor processes and the second is the concentration of this knowledge as the exclusive province of management – together with its essential converse, the absence of such knowledge among the workers – then the third is the *use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution* (Braverman 1974, p. 119).

With the implementation of these principles, power within the workplace shifted heavily towards management. In this process work was increasingly fragmented, routinised and subjugated to management control. It entailed according to Drucker 'the analysis of work into its simplest elements and the systematic improvement of worker's performance of each of these elements' (1954, p. 280).

But while Taylor explicitly stresses the economic rationality which will lead to employee acceptance of scientific management, implicit is the threat of coercion. He, himself, is perfectly aware that such changes will be resisted and contested so that workers will need to be either coerced or persuaded that they need to act 'rationally'. Thus the 'science of work' developed by management with its rules, fragmentation of work, and appropriation of worker knowledge must be imposed on the employees in the workforce. Consequently,

> it is only through *enforced* standardisation of methods, *enforced* adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and *enforced* co-operation that this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of standards and of *enforcing* this co-operation rests with management alone (Taylor 1972a, p. 83).

Thus scientific management was based on the concept of control: control of knowledge; control of the work process and its evaluation and control of motivation through economic gain. By such control Taylor's

methods offered both the prospect of lower costs through increased efficiency and increased control of workers by management. This view influenced not only businessmen but also educational administrators who modelled themselves on their counterparts in industry. In addition, they saw another benefit – an increase in their status in society through the use of the 'vocabulary and techniques of industry' (Callahan 1962). Through the use of these new methods of management, educators could avoid the criticism of inefficiency.

Reading 6

C. R. Littler, 'Understanding Taylorism', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1978, pp. 185–202.

Activity 4.1

Littler argues that an understanding of Taylorism is important to 'grasp the present'. List the ways that the concepts of Taylorism help to understand your own organisation.

Taylorism today

Taylor's views not only have considerable historical importance but are also vital in obtaining a clear understanding of how and why industry is organised today. However, as administrators in the public sector seek to emulate their private industry counterparts and the patterns of the social relations of control in the public sector basically mirror the social relations of capitalist production found in private industry, then his views are also important in understanding the administration and organisation of educational systems. This importance has been stated quite clearly by Braverman:

> It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the scientific management movement in the shaping of the modern corporation and indeed all institutions of capitalist society which carry on labor processes. The popular notion that Taylorism has been 'superceded' by later schools of industrial psychology or 'human relations', that it 'failed'–because of Taylor's amateurish and naive views of human motivation or because it brought about a storm of labor opposition or because Taylor and various successors antagonized workers and sometimes management as well–or that it is 'outmoded' because certain Taylorian specifics like functional foremanship or his incentive-pay schemes have been discarded for more sophisticated methods: all these represent woeful misreading of the actual dynamics of the development of management (Braverman 1974, p. 86).

The principles of Taylorism are still a powerful force in the administration of organisations in both the private and public sectors. Indeed, the fragmentation, division and deskilling of jobs is not only increasing in the private workplace (Zimbalist 1979; Greenbaum 1979; Kraft 1977), but is also becoming evident in the educational system (Apple 1981a; Giroux 1981).

Research by Davis et. al. (1972) found that the principles of scientific management still decide how work will be structured, organised and administered for the majority of members of most organisations. They found that:

> Overwhelmingly influencing the design of industrial jobs is the criterion of minimizing, immediate cost of producing, i.e., the cost of performing the required operations. The usual indicator of achievement is minimum unit operation time. Designers of jobs see the criterion as being satisfied by the application of the following principles or guides for specifying job content;
>
> (a) the content of individual jobs is specified:
> (i) so as to achieve specialization of skill
> (ii) so as to minimize skill requirements
> (iii) so as to minimize learning time or operator training time.

(b) Individual tasks are combined into specific jobs so that:
  (i) specialization is achieved whenever possible by limiting the number of tasks in a job and limiting the variations in tasks or jobs;
  (ii) the content of the job is as repetitive as possible;
  (iii) training time is minimized (Davis et al. 1972, p. 79).

They conclude by stating that, whatever the rhetoric of conventional schools of management studies, still

current job design practices are consistent with the principles of rationalization or scientific management. They minimize the dependence of the organization on the individual. At the same time they minimize the contribution of the individual in the organization (Davis et al. 1972, p. 80).

The central drive in the scientific management movement was to reduce the worker to an unthinking appendage of the machine. This was to be achieved through the transfer of workshop knowledge to management. However, it not only affected the workplace but also the school system through the adoption of Taylor's philosophy of management, the instrumental production view of education and attempts to measure specific outcomes of the educational system. In this way, education was fragmented in the name of efficiency (Besag 1981; Kliebard 1975).

Scientific management as ideology

It becomes important at this point to distinguish between scientific management as *practice* and scientific management as *ideology*. For as a complete process of management practice the ideas were rarely put into practice. When it was, it was largely implemented by small non-unionised firms. In the larger unionised firms it was fiercely contested by the employees. Yet much was learnt from these initial attempts. While daily instruction cards, extreme time and motion studies and differential piecework were abandoned a number of ideological underpinnings endured. Firstly, was the quest by management for control over the special knowledge of production. Secondly, was the implementation of defined, adequate standards of performance. Thirdly, management itself was put under management control.

These facets of scientific management were no longer industrial or political problems of the developing capitalist order, but instead were put forward as problems of science and technology. These are subject to expert knowledge and skill, and are dealt with without favouritism or emotion in a neutrality which will ensure the best technical solution. 'Efficiency' became a 'scientific' matter and not one which reflected the dominant social relations of the workplace. Such an ideology masks the true relationship by appearing as a cohesive force through which both the dominant and dominated work to achieve technical solutions to their problems.

Scientific mangement was important because

the application of science to the labor process led not only to the 'expansion of the forces of production' but simultaneously laid the basis of a new ideology in which the preservation of capitalist relations was presented as a technical matter to be removed from political discourse. The pursuit of 'efficiency' became the basis of a new ideology, a new form of domination. Rationality was turned on its head and became irrationality (Burawoy 1978, p. 251).

Through this process the social relations of capitalism are obscured and any intervention in the labour process can be couched in scientific technical terms thereby gaining legitimacy.

In this context, the development of scientific management and its inherent ideology converges with a major aspect of critical theory. This concerns the demystification of the role which science and technology play in capitalist society. Habermas (1971) suggests that the increasing rationalisation of organisations is 'linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development [which] realizes not rationality as such but rather, in the name of rationality, a specific form of unacknowledged political domination' (1971, pp. 81–2). Thus the legitimation system of advanced capitalism tends to revolve around technical and scientific problems. To this end the political system works to make whatever technical adjustments and scientific innovations are required in order to ensure the smooth functioning and perpetuation of the capitalist system.

Through this process, legitimation of power and the status quo are obtained under the 'mantle of modern science' with a strength more considerable than in the past. For as Habermas argues:

> today's dominant, rather glassy background ideology, which makes a fetish of science, is more irresistible and far-reaching than ideologies of the old type. For with the veiling of practical problems it not only justifies a particular class's interests in domination and represses another class's partial need for emancipation but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such (Habermas 1971, p. 111).

The dominant ideology is one of technocratic consciousness by which dominant groups in society are legitimated through the reification of science and technological progress.

A critical theory of organisations would explain why one class dominates another; it would offer an interpretive account of actions and practices; it would provide *quasi-causal* accounts of the relationship between social structures and kinds of behaviour; it would offer an historical account of how individuals came to be what they are; it would provide an ideology-critique of how people come to accept repressive social practices; it would offer a theory of crises indicating at which period in time people would be willing to listen to the ideology-critique; it would explain through a theory of communication how people have developed false consciousness and how this can be avoided; and it would provide an action plan to show people how to act and organise themselves differently (Habermas, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1979; Fay 1977; Bates 1982; Foster 1982; Giroux 1982; Denhardt 1981). Through such a critical theory of organisations and their administration much of what is accepted as 'rationality' would be unmasked. Structures of organisations, while often having disastrous human consequences, would not be viewed as neutral entities 'embodying inexorable and unavoidable and impartial constraints deriving from the basic processes of industrialization' (Salaman 1979, p. 29): instead concepts such as 'efficiency' would become problematic. In whose interests is it? Who gains? Who loses by these new efficiency methods? Such a style of administration while not only assisting individuals would also help to democratise organisations. Such a development, Habermas argues, would be characterised by:

> a decreasing degree of repressiveness (which at the level of personality structure should increase average tolerance of ambiguity in the face of role conflicts), a decreasing degree of *rigidity* (which should multiply the chances of an individually stable self-presentation in everyday interaction), and approximation to a type of behavioural control that would allow role distance and the flexible application of norms that while well-internalized, would be accessible to reflection (Habermas 1971, p. 119).

By indulging in a critique of domination through science and technology, administrators may open up new horizons regarding how and why schools are organised. These may include a new clarity of communication between the administrator and the administered; a greater degree of choice rather than regulation; and a recognition of the need for increased reflection and purposeful action.

The human relations school

The human relations school of management developed through three contributing factors: the Depression, labour unrest and organisation and the influence of the Hawthorne studies. But, as Braverman points out:

> Taylor dealt with the fundamentals of the organization of the labor process and of control over it. The [human relationists] dealt primarily with the adjustment of the worker to the ongoing production process as that process was designed by the industrial engineer ... Work itself is organized according to Taylorian principles, while personnel departments and academics have busied themselves with the selection, training, manipulation, pacification, and adjustment of 'manpower' to suit the work process so organized. Taylorism dominates the world of production, the practitioners of 'human relations'; and 'industrial psychology' are the maintenance crew for the human machinery (Braverman 1974, p. 87).

However, Braverman does make the following distinction between scientific and human relations management:

> Job design represents *reality* while personnel administration represents only *mythology*. From the point of view of the corporation, there is no inconsistency, since the latter represents a manipulation to habituate the worker to the former (Braverman 1974, p. 146).

Administration through human relations management is however not used merely to 'habituate' or propagandise labour to the labour process but is a means to manipulate labour in a different but just as important way as scientific management. For both management strategies the motivation remains the same. This is the aim of maximizing the output per man-hour from each employee.

Owens (1970) is wide of the mark when he writes:

> The shift from the classical theory of organization behavior to the human relations approach represented a breakthrough of 'new' knowledge, new insight, new understanding – in short – new theory (Owens 1970, p. 29).

The basic approach to employees remained the same. While the 'logic of efficiency' may have been modified by the 'logic of feelings' inherent in the informal work group, any modification was basically peripheral. For the practical effect of the implementation of a 'human relations' approach is ultimately identical with scientific management. It has done this through its emphasis on the development of supervisory skills at the lower levels within management and by diverting attention away from structural, technological or economic conflict issues to one of 'communication' (Watson 1980, p. 38).

The rise of human relations

Human relations became important during the Depression of the 1930s when increased industrial unrest and unionisation were becoming manifest during a time of capitalist crisis. Alternative approaches to the management of labour were sought by capital, which would more clearly legitimate the forms of control and power relations in the workplace.

Such an approach eventuated through the Hawthorne studies which were carried out by the Department of Industrial Research of Harvard University of which Elton Mayo was a member. Although the original experiments were initiated by the Western Electric Company managers in co-operation with D. C. Jackson, an MIT electrical engineering professor, the Harvard school became involved after Mayo's visit in 1928 (Franke 1979). At this time the Harvard industrial school was looking for ways in which the influence of liberals and Marxists might be countered (Gouldner 1971).

The investigations were undertaken at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant. Firstly, they conducted research in the Relay Assembly Test Room over a period of five years. Payment incentive schemes were introduced. Rest pauses were spaced throughout the work and shorter hours and refreshments were implemented. Without exception output increased with each change made. This result was later described as the 'Hawthorne Effect'. The increased production was attributed to the changed social situations of the workers. The improved interpersonal relationship between the experimenters (supervisors) and the workers, the better communications and the development of informal groups all permitted greater social cohesiveness in bringing together the needs of the group with the production requirements of management.

Other experiments included a massive interviewing schedule of over 21 000 people during a three year period. This suggests that many of the problems in the workplace were caused by management neglecting the emotions and sentiments of employees. A third piece of research was the Bank Wiring Observation Room Study. Here it was suggested that often workers do not act as 'rational', 'economic' beings but rather attitudes and work restrictions develop from informal social pressures.

Criticisms of human relations

The Hawthorne studies have exerted great influence in schools of management and administration as they have sought new ways to increase productivity by manipulating social factors. New research on leadership, leadership training and group relations arose from Hawthorne. Such research, Perrow notes:

> pointed the way to manipulation of the worker, who was seen as a child or primitive whose self-protective mechanisms and efforts to reduce monotony and boredom were not in the interests of a co-operative social system. Mayo compared the industrial researchers to physicians, administering to the ills of workers, but it is not at all clear that the efficiency of industrial organization is in the same category as individual good health (Perrow 1979, p. 95).

The human relations approach to management has also been criticised for its managerial bias where only management is viewed as rational. As Kerr states in Perrow, 'We cannot accept the view that rationality and initiative are vouchsafed only to the elite, and that the common man is left only the virtue of faith and obedience' (1979, p. 95). In addition, the actual research methodology has been harshly criticised by Carey who stated that:

> the results of these studies far from supporting the various components of the 'human relations approach' are surprisingly consistent with a rather old world view about the value of monetary incentives, driving leadership and discipline ... The limitations of the Hawthorne studies clearly render them incapable of yielding serious support for any sort of generalization whatever (Carey 1967, p. 416).

The influence of managerial discipline in the context of unemployment and economic depression (Franke & Kaul 1978) is also overlooked in favour of the work group. Such an emphasis distracts attention away from the large-scale effects of society. Considerations of conflict, power structures, the appropriation of skills, mechanisation and unemployment are neatly sidestepped. As Perrow argues, 'that such conflicts of interests and inequalities of power might be solved by better face-to-face relations between workers and management, or by the famous counselling system seemed doubtful' (1979, p. 95). In this regard a recent study by Bramel & Friend (1981) has attacked the picture of 'easily manipulated workers' presented by the studies. In a review of the research data it is stated:

> the picture we get, instead, is of a group of rather wary workers engaged in a continuing skirmish with management and determined not to be taken advantage of. Rather than becoming a part of the company 'team', they became a team of their own, rather coolly looking out for their own economic interests in an adversary relationship with management (Bramel & Friend 1981, p. 874).

The human relations school and their more recent adherents such as Herzberg and McGregor survive because they seek to present the prevailing social relations of capitalism as neutral, as a 'given', and that through unity and cohesiveness in the workplace, any problems might be overcome. Through increased participation and enrichment the trend of increasing militancy, absenteeism and contestation might be alleviated. But too often such schemes neglect the actual view of the subject of the job enrichment program. As one worker related to Nichols:

> You move from one boring, dirty, monotonous job to another boring dirty monotonous job. And somehow you're supposed to come out of it all 'enriched'. But I never feel 'enriched'—I just feel knackered (Nichols 1980, p. 279).

Human relations schemes and their more recent manifestations only act as a veneer to the existing social relations of production. The existing power structure is preserved and participation and enrichment are limited to endorsing and legitimising the prevailing distribution of power and the status quo. Managerial decision-making prerogatives are not challenged and managements' rights to make far reaching decisions are not questioned. Thus by recombining fragmented operations in a complex production process, capital can achieve not just the ideological advantage of claiming to have 'enlarged' jobs but also a real economic benefit of extracting greater output from the workers' potential labour (see Coombs 1978).

Reading 7

A. Carey, 'Industrial psychology and sociology in Australia', in P. Boreham, A. Pemberton & P. Wilson (eds), *The Professions: A Critical Appraisal*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia 1976.

Activity 4.2

Summarise the argument Carey presents on the human relations school. Analyse the argument in the light of Drucker's assertion that it is 'a means of busting the unions'.

The influence of business management strategies in education

Throughout the last hundred years the dominant model on which the organisation and administration of schools has been based has been derived from corporate management. This has influenced the organisation of schools during the earlier social efficiency movement which developed in the post-World War I period and the new social efficiency movement which has arisen in the 1970s.

The social efficiency movement

The basic ideology of this view of schooling is that students should be prepared to fit the demands of the existing reality of the workplace. Social efficiency educators proposed that schools should be organised to prepare students for their place in society so that national unity and order might be preserved.

Educators such as Sneddon, Bobbitt, Cubberly, Thorndike and Ellwood held the assumption that the general welfare of the community coincides with business manpower requirements. Thus as Callahan argues it was:

> No wonder that schoolmen sought to emulate the efficiency of business and use whatever methods business has used to attain it; and no wonder that 'scientific management' appeared in the forefront of these methods. Its appearance, however, was an unhappy one for our educational system. For instead of approaching the study of administration through the social sciences, school administrators applied the 'science' of business-industrial management as they understood it (Callahan 1962, p. 245).

These educators took Taylor's ideas and applied them to schools. The quest for efficiency was directed at both the management of schools in which the transition of the superintendent of schools from an educator to a business manager took place, and the curriculum (Kliebard 1975).

Bobbitt in particular was greatly influenced by Taylor. He also put forward four principles of scientific management. His first principle was to use all the plant all the available time. His second principle was to reduce the number of workers to a minimum by keeping each at the maximum of his work efficiency. His third principle involved the elimination of waste. Bobbitt's fourth principle moved from efficiency in the workplace to efficiency in educational theory. A suitably administered school would

> work up the raw material into that finished product for which it is best adapted. Applied to education this means: educate the individual according to his capabilities. This requires that the materials of the curriculum be sufficiently various to meet the needs of every class of individuals in the community; and the course of training and study be sufficiently flexible that the individual can be just the things he needs (quoted in Kliebard 1975, p. 56).

Bobbitt thus mirrored the principles of Taylor not only to organise the school but also to organise the products from the school. As such, the optimal role of students passing through such an educational institution is to adapt to a predetermined and preselected pattern of behaviour befitting their class (Franklin 1976).

Sneddon (1916) also considered that social efficiency is the position in education that calls for direct teaching of knowledge, attitudes and skills intended to shape the individual's predetermined social characteristics (see

Drost 1967). As Taylor had applied science to management in the quest for efficiency Sneddon also felt that educators could employ science to increase efficiency in education.

> The final and general thesis is this; all education is tending to become scientific, to become a field of applied science, as are already medicine, war, navigation, agriculture, metal working and the like. But efficiency of action in any field of applied science is possible only on the basis of clearly defined aims. Right methods and sound testing of results are practicable only as they are consciously and specifically based upon clearly defined and carefully tested aims. To prove itself capable of developing in accordance with scientific standards and principles, education must in all its phases formulate and study its new problems and aims (Sneddon 1916, p. 187).

Ellwood too believed that an educational system based on rational, scientific principles was needed to control the individual. As the majority of students were to become followers or workers then the school should teach them to follow well, so making an efficient society. Ellwood argued that:

> Systems of education have not been created for the training and development of individuals as such, but rather to fit the individual for membership in society, that is to control the process by which they acquire habits, so that they shall advantageously, co-ordinate their activities with those of their group (quoted in Franklin 1976, p. 309).

Central to this application of the ideology of science and scientific management to schooling was the factory metaphor of the school. This Kliebard (1975) argues is responsible for the process-product mode of rationality that still influences school systems at the present time. The organisational and curriculum models of schooling still reflect the ideology of industrial production.

Such technological models with their origin in industry, view students in industrial terms as raw materials to be molded into the finished products. As Cubberly argued:

> Our schools are, in a sense, factories, in which the raw products (children) are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life. The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of twentieth-century civilization and it is the business of the school to build its pupils according to the specifications laid down. This demands good tools, specialised machinery, continuous measurement of production to see if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture and a large variety in the output (quoted in Kliebard 1975, p. 52).

From such a perspective the essential role of the student is the adoption of a predetermined and preselected pattern of behaviour (Apple 1979). This pattern of behaviour is associated with a curriculum which is organised and administered to reflect what might be called managerial education. Here the curriculum is evaluated on its ability to meet the demands of the dominant economic institutions. This centrality of the curriculum to the school as a factory is pointed out by Bobbitt.

> If the school were a factory, the child the raw material, the ideal adult the finished product, the teacher an operative, the principal a foreman, then the curriculum could be thought of as whatever processing the raw material needs to change him into the finished product (quoted in Gallagher 1980, p. 5).

Similar to the basic ideology behind the new management strategies in the world of work, educationalists veiled the inequalities and class structure inherent in schooling under the rhetoric of science and technology. The interests of the dominant class are ensured whilst being obscured and legitimated through the predominance of 'neutral'

technological considerations. In this way the administration of educational structures and the curriculum becomes an instrument of social control. Control which ensures conformity and the maintenance of the status quo.

Reading 8
B. M. Franklin, 'The social efficiency movement: Curriculum change in Minneapolis 1917–1950', *Curriculum Inquiry*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1982, pp. 9–33.

Activity 4.3
Analyse the argument provided by Franklin on the ways social efficiency ideas entered the curriculum and the form they took.

The new efficiency movement

In the 1970s and 1980s there has arisen the new efficiency movement or new cult of efficiency (Beare 1982). This movement has been associated with the increasing economic crisis that most capitalist countries find themselves in. To counter the effects of the crisis the state and the educational system under its control has increasingly turned to corporate models of management as a means of solving the problem. As Apple puts it:

> The current solution is to couple the tightening of control and accountability, reductions in spending, and closer ties between schools and industry on the one hand with the rhetoric of local control, parental choice and a 'free market' individualism on the other (Apple 1981, p. 383).

Reading 1
H. Beare, 'Education's corporate image', *Unicorn*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1982, pp. 12–28.

Activity 4.4
Summarise the reasons given for the rise of the 'new efficiency' movement and how Beare thinks schools should react.

If we accept Braverman's (1974) proposition that while practices may differ the ideology of Taylorism still holds in the workplace and society generally, then the current calls for cost-effectiveness, core-curriculum, vocationalism and increased efficiency in schools might be viewed more clearly. In current terms the ideology of the social efficiency movement can be exemplified by the Williams Report (Committee of Inquiry into Education and Training 1979). The argument is concerned with economic considerations and control achieved through the closer alignment of the school with corporatist practices. In this way, education might be more closely tied to the needs of capital while costs are cut through greater control accountability and the reduction of 'wasteful' expenditure. As Bates has argued the Williams Report is

> concerned primarily with the function of education in providing a trained workforce; with ensuring basic adequacy of performance in work-related skills; with stratifying the output of schools through nationally recognized tests, with the closer articulation of opportunity with higher education and training, and the resultant stratification; and with the integration of the hierarchy of educational opportunity with the hierarchy of occupational opportunity. (Bates 1981, p. 8).

Reading 2
R. J. Bates, 'Education and the corporate economy – a response to Hedley Beare' *Unicorn*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1982, pp. 351-62.

Activity 4.5
List the problems Bates sees in an approach to education such as that taken by Beare. Which position do you think is the more valid?

Such a view of education in which control is increased while costs are reduced implies a social control mechanism in which the school is used as an instrument to rectify the imbalances and contradictions of the current recession. The school, in this sense, is seen as a regulating agency through which order and consensus in the existing economic structure might be engineered.

In particular, the main concern of many educational administrators is that of technical rationality which still reflects the positivistic interpretation of the act of administering. As Waldo points out the

> mutually supporting concepts which seem to ground the study of complex organizations include scientific rationality, effectiveness, efficiency and productivity (Waldo 1978, p. 591).

This reflection of the new efficiency movement in educational administration has been termed by Gronn (1982) 'Neo-Taylorism'. In a survey of eight recent studies of school administrators he found the prevalence of 'crude Tayloristic thinking'. This included a pre-occupation with seeking 'the one best method, and with a concern for efficiency'. He concludes by indicating that the studies

> have reverted back to, or updated, primitive motion and time measurement techniques pioneered by F. W. Taylor and his associates. Whether these early forays are preludes to more sophisticated sets of appraisal techniques leading to the formulation of 'effort standards' and competencies for principals is not yet clear, suffice it to say that signs are there in embryo (Gronn 1982, p. 19).

As this section has indicated, the question might be asked as to whether Taylor's methods have ever been discarded. While the initial crude practices may have fallen into disrepute the basic ideological force of efficiency through science and technology has held sway and continues to hold sway, in fact with increasing emphasis.

Conclusion

This section has examined the effects of scientific management on both subsequent management techniques and the administration of schools. It has argued that while certain practices have been discontinued, the ideology underpinning Taylorism is still *the* dominant force in administration today. Administrative practices are still considered in 'neutral', 'objective' terms requiring 'scientific' quantification for a technical solution.

Such processes have been earnestly taken up by educational administrators during the present poor economic circumstances. Educationalists have looked to increasing cost efficiency, accountability and staff rationalisation in an attempt to achieve the desired economic outcomes. For many the main quest is to tie education more closely to the practices and structures of the corporate sector regardless of the

continuing stratification and inequalities that exist. These are, however, both technical problems which ignore the power relationship, class structure and legitimating ideologies that form the covert mechanisms of organisations. Hopefully, such factors will replace considerations of efficiency and best methods in a critical social theory of organisations.

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SECTION 5
THE ADMINISTRATOR AS EDUCATOR

John Codd

'The Rise', oiled steel by D. Wilson, 1980, Geelong Art Gallery.

THE ADMINISTRATOR AS EDUCATOR

John Codd

Introduction

The previous section constitutes both a review and a critique of the 'management approach' to educational administration. By locating the origins of this approach in the much broader tradition of 'scientific management', it has been possible to show how economic and political concepts employed initially to describe and define particular forms of social relationship within industrial contexts have subsequently been transported into the educational sphere as part of an ideology of control. That there has been apparently little resistance to this trend amongst educators themselves is in part due to the pervasiveness of the ideological forces involved, but it is also a reflection of the failure of traditional theories guiding educational administration to recognise and promote the distinctively *educational* features of those institutions where educational administration takes place. Thus, administrative theory has become separated from educational theory with the effect of distorting and narrowing the way educational administrators interpret their roles. This section will attempt a reconceptualisation of educational administration in which the central focus is on the *administering of education* rather than the *organisational management* of educational institutions. This calls firstly for a renewed notion of what educational leadership is all about and secondly how this can be embodied within the concept of educational administration itself.

Administration, education and schooling

If the concept of educational administration is to include significantly more than is implied by educational management then it is necessary to consider what education means and how this can be related to the goals of schooling.

In thinking about education, it is sometimes useful to make a distinction between its *formal* and *informal* aspects. In formal education, to use Langford's (1973) definition, two parties may be distinguished, one of whom, the teacher, accepts responsibility for what the other, the pupil, learns. When learning occurs without this condition being met, the term *informal education* may be used. This distinction has acquired greater significance in recent years as it has been recognised that schools and other educational institutions have many socialising effects, producing learning that is not necessarily related to the purposive, self-conscious practical activities associated with teaching. These effects have been referred to as a 'hidden' or 'unstated' curriculum that can be contrasted with the 'formal' or 'planned' curriculum of schools. Indeed, it is frequently argued that the socialising effects of the hidden curriculum are miseducative to such a degree that formal education becomes thwarted by the institutions in which it is carried out, namely schools. For example, when Illich writes:

> Equal opportunity is, indeed, both a desirable and a feasible goal, but to equate this with obligatory schooling is to confuse salvation with the Church (Illich 1970, p. 18).

he is suggesting that schooling and education are quite separate concepts. The implication is that formal education inevitably becomes equated with obligatory schooling unless we see it as occurring outside the institution of schooling. This leads into the highly polemical argument for the total 'deschooling' of society.

But formal education is not *necessarily* a process of socialisation or schooling in this narrow sense, and as educators become more concerned with increasing educational opportunity and less concerned with preserving the institution of schooling we may begin to see substantial reforms to both the structure and functioning of schools. Such reforms, however, are not possible within a management ethos because the relationship of managerial activities and long-term educational outcomes remains unclear. Managerial strategies are basically supportive of the status quo. They rest on the assumption that what is learned in schools should be determined, either directly or indirectly by social and cultural factors that impinge on the classroom from the wider community outside the school gates.

Thus when managerial effectiveness usurps more important educational aims we are more likely to have schools in which the needs of society are given priority over the development of rational autonomy and independent thought. Under these conditions, political forces are better able to ensure that the school remains an instrument for social control. But this is a function that perhaps should be called into question because implicit in such a view is a strong commitment to the harmonious continuity of prevailing values and the perpetuation of the existing social order.

In order to place the role and responsibilities of educational administrators into a wider perspective, we need to consider some of the central criteria of the concept of education itself, as distinct from the process of schooling. When we do this we begin to see that specifying a set of 'social functions' which a particular administrative arrangement can be said to serve is not the same as specifying its educational justification. Likewise, to invoke as a rationale for administrative practice its particular managerial consequences may have very little to do with whether it is valuable or worthwhile, or ought to belong in an educational context or situation. The fact that schools may function more smoothly under some administrative arrangements rather than others provides no sure measure of their educational value. This point is brought out very clearly in the following reading.

Reading 9
W. Taylor, 'The head as manager: Some criticisms', in R. S. Peters (ed.), *The Role of the Head*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

Activity 5.1
List Taylor's criticisms of the application of management techniques to schools.

Taylor (1976) is very concerned that management techniques may encourage people to behave in ways that are antithetical to certain fundamental educational values. To what extent is this concern warranted? The argument, it would seem, depends very much upon the justification that can be offered for the educational administrator being

an important exemplar of these fundamental educational values, rather than a facilitator of learning or an agent of socialisation. Taylor argues that:

> If we accept that the primary purpose of the school is educative, then it follows that the initiation of action and the legitimation of authority within the school derive mainly from the work of those people appointed as professionally competent to undertake the education of pupils, namely the head and his staff. Relationships within the school are not those of naked soul to naked soul. They are always and necessarily mediated by professional responsibilities and a commitment to the communication of knowledge and skills within public traditions of greater or less antiquity. The authority of the head is legitimated not by his skill as a manager or facilitator but by his stature as an educated person and an educator. Managerial training may supplement these qualities, it can never substitute for them (Taylor 1976, p. 43).

Particular managerial skills may be useful, but for the educational administrator, 'a fully professional commitment is always to a set of values and principles for practice rather than to a particular institution in which the individual happens currently to hold an appointment' (p. 44). This commitment will spring from a knowledge that formal education should be a purposeful and responsible activity—that it should be a practical activity, not completely determined by the institution of schooling, but arising out of the personal decisions of administrators, teachers and pupils and carried out within the specified social context of the school.

Professional educators, whether they be policy-makers, administrators or teachers, are inevitably involved in the business of judging and deciding what ought to be done. Whether they are determining ends or means, they cannot escape the commitment to values; neither can they ignore the careful appraisal of facts—psychological, sociological or historical—pertinent to each decision. It is the bringing together of these two components that produces the *responsibility* criterion which is so important in formal education, and which can distinguish it from socialisation or schooling in the narrow sense. As a practical activity, therefore, educational administration should entail responsible deliberation and decision making, enabling teachers within the school to have an active role in producing an educated community of individuals who will have the capacity to promote dynamic, democratic social order.

This leads to a concept of the 'administrator-as-representative', a view which is not compatible with educational institutions that adopt a rigidly bureaucratic form of organisation and management. If it is to be realised in action, therefore, such a view may require an extensive reconceptualisation of the field. Indeed, this is precisely what Ogilvie (1982) suggests in the next reading.

Reading 10
D. Ogilvie, 'Educational Administration: What, whither and whence?' *Unicorn*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1982, pp. 38–43.

Activity 5.2
Taking Ogilvie's three concepts of administrator-as-representative, administrator-as-factional-agent and administrator-as-director, list the main characteristics of each in three separate columns.

Administration and the practice of democracy

Ogilvie (1982) claims that 'educational administrators need a theory-to-guide-action that is compatible with the nature of education'. He then suggests that the framework for such a theory might be located within a form of consensual or collegial democracy. This raises a number of very interesting issues concerning the nature of democracy as well as the nature of education. This is not the place to explore these issues in detail as they would require much more analysis than that for which we have scope. Some aspects of democracy, however, are worth considering at this point.

First, it should be acknowledged that democracy, like education, is an essentially contested concept in that there are no obvious criteria by which its features might always be recognised. As a form of government it is ideally one in which social control is vested in 'the people' rather than in 'the rulers', so that those who are affected by administrative or legislative action can be consulted and can influence such action in accordance with their personal interests. But, as Dewey (1916) pointed out, democracy is more than a form of government; it is 'primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience' (p. 87). Dewey held that democracy is characterised by a 'widening of the area of shared concerns and the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities'. It is often this notion that gives rise to so-called democratic practices such as discussion, consultation and representation—practices that, for many, appear to have become the defining features of participatory democracy. The expectation of such administrative practices very often is that they will resolve conflicts of interests by achieving consensus.

However, this view of democracy, which takes it to be merely a set of administrative practices, is clearly limited, for it provides no account of the underlying principles of which such practices are only the outward manifestation. While practices which extend discussion and consultation are necessary to the democratic process, they are not sufficient for the achievement of democratic outcomes unless they arise out of an overriding concern for truth and are accompanied by a prior commitment to basic moral principles such as fairness, freedom and respect for persons.

Discussion and consultation, as practices, will lead to justifiable policies or decisions only if there exists a prior commitment to these fundamental procedural principles under which various claims and interests can be appraised and compared. As the educational philosopher, Peters points out:

> To decide things by discussion requires truth-telling, respect for persons, and the impartial consideration of interests, as underlying moral principles (Peters 1979, p. 468).

Without doubt, freedom of discussion (which presupposes availability of information) is a necessary condition for democracy, but in the absence of these moral principles it is clearly not a sufficient condition. For, in the words of Benn & Peters in their classic text on the subject:

> discussion degenerates into mere abuse unless there is a minimal respect for persons as sources of arguments ... Discussion presupposes, then, a consensus on fundamentals, for where this is lacking, men will treat one another as scoundrels, and differences of opinion will be undiscussible ... where men start from different assumptions, there are no adjustments and no compromises generally felt to be fair and reasonable. In such conditions, politics is a cynical grasping for whatever advantages temporary power combinations can secure (Benn & Peters 1959, pp. 352–3).

Regrettably, these are the conditions that underlie many bureaucratic and managerial forms of administration. However, without a realisation that democracy entails more than the counting of heads and that the purpose of consultation is not consensus but justification, there is little likelihood that participation in itself will be either effective or desirable. This is particularly important when it comes to educational decisions such as those concerning the selection of curriculum content.

Administration and the aims of education

The central point of the above discussion is that democratic practices in themselves will not ensure the pursuit of educational aims. Unless the administrator is committed to deeper educational principles there is always a strong danger that the social functions of the school will assume priority over its educational goals. This is a major consideration in that area of educational administration concerned with curriculum planning.

From the outset it should be recognised that specifying 'social functions' with respect to the curriculum has similar effects to specifying them for any other administrative arrangement. Indeed, as with other practices, to invoke as a rationale for some specific curriculum content its 'social functions' may have very little to do with whether it has educational value and therefore ought to be taught to students in the school. For example, the fact that achievement, motivation and competition are essential to a capitalist economy is no argument for their educational value. Indeed, the very point of social education, if it is to be morally defensible, is that existing social practices be subjected to critical evaluation and rational scrutiny aimed at finding out whether such practices are worth perpetuating and whether they are capable of being defended with respect to the educational goals of autonomy, emancipation and human well-being.

To accept existing social practice as the basis for curriculum planning is to confuse education with socialisation, and this is a confusion to which many educational administrators are susceptible. Although it is part of the purpose of education to transmit the prevailing norms and ways of behaving that characterise some of the groups in society to which the individual will ultimately belong it is not enough, in a democratic society, to achieve this using procedures that lead to lack of awareness of or tolerance towards various alternatives, or to bring it about in any way which denies the individual the capacity for rational and independent judgment.

A curriculum for education then would differ from a curriculum for socialisation in at least four ways:

1. Whereas education would be aiming at the development of rationally autonomous individuals, socialisation would be concerned with developing people who could function smoothly within their society.

2. Whereas education would endeavour to provide the concepts, capacities and knowledge required for testing truth claims and justifying beliefs, socialisation would provide those skills, beliefs, attitudes and intelligence required to bring the individual into a harmonious relationship with society.

3. Whereas education would emphasise the importance of producing evidence and rational arguments in support of one's actions and beliefs, in socialisation belief and action would be sanctioned either by heritage and tradition or by the power of the majority.

4. Whereas in the educational process, the ends of actions, policies and institutions are matters for open inquiry, in the socialisation process ends are largely presupposed and unquestioned.

Administration and core curriculum

These important distinctions have been clearly recognised in the core curriculum proposal that was prepared and distributed in 1980 by the National Curriculum Development Centre, (CDC), Canberra. This 23-page publication entitled *Core Curriculum for Australian Schools* is the first national statement on core curriculum in Australia by a public authority and in that respect it may be regarded as a landmark document. It is certainly a document to which educational administrators should give serious attention, for, in the words of the former director of the Centre:

> The CDC document is a policy discussion paper rather than a blueprint for syllabus makers. It does not purport to be or to express *the* core curriculum for Australian schools, the definition of which is, ultimately, a task for the schools themselves. The Centre's paper does, nevertheless, develop a view about core curriculum, upon which it invites discussion, and it presents a framework of broadly defined learnings within which core curricula may be designed by schools and other educational agencies (Skilbeck 1980, p. 20).

The document begins with an outline of contemporary social changes and developments to which schools must respond, declaring that core curriculum is a *necessary*, but not a *sufficient* response to these changes. The important distinction between schooling and education is clearly made in the context of a discussion about universal aims of education and more specific aims for Australian schools. This provides a backdrop against which the core curriculum proposal is developed.

Reading 11
Curriculum Development Centre, *Core Curriculum for Australian Schools*, Canberra, 1980.

Activity 5.3
In the document it states: 'Schools and all those associated with them have a number of tasks to perform in order to refine and further develop core curricula.' Write down what you would consider to be the main tasks required of educational administrators.

In its proposal for a core curriculum, the CDC document distinguishes between learning that is oriented towards processes, and learning that is oriented mainly towards the content areas of knowledge and experience (pp. 16–17). This distinction warrants further discussion because it relates to the particular view of education which underlies the CDC concept of core curriculum and it is necessary for administrators to grasp that view if they are to incorporate it into a consistent view of schooling.

Process learnings are more concerned with doing than with knowing, with principles and methods of inquiry rather than with the accumulation of facts, and with feelings, sensitivities, beliefs, attitudes and values rather than with the mastery of knowledge. They are learnings relating to self-knowledge; concern for others; clarification of aesthetic and moral values; the acquisition of transferable skills such as those involved in scientific investigation; the fostering of the urge to inquire and 'learning how to learn'.

Content learnings, on the other hand, are essentially those concerned with the acquisition of general skills such as those of communication and computation; the mastery of a body of factual information about the physical and social environment; the initiation into substantive forms of human knowledge such as history and science; and the acquisition of competencies relevant to specific vocations.

In the past the general consensus appears to have been that content goals reflect the primary function of formal education. But this is no longer the case. At least three broad factors have been responsible for the increasing potency of process goals in education. First, there has been a growing awareness of the inevitable socialising influence that the school as an institution exerts through what is now referred to as the 'hidden' curriculum. Secondly, concern for pupil development has extended beyond the limits of the cognitive domain to include an increasing number of explicit educational objectives relating to the social, emotional and moral development of young people. Thirdly, the notion of education as a self-reflective and socially critical process rather than a narrow form of vocational training or preparation has been a natural consequence of the increasing complexity of contemporary social change, its lack of firm direction and the necessity for continuing and penetrating critique. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the core curriculum proposal reflects each of these trends.

The CDC document recognises that within a truly educational curriculum, both process and content are complementary and important. For there can be no richness and depth of knowledge without the development of cognitive processes, and there can be no point to such processes without a solid basis of knowledge and understanding or cultural meanings upon which they can operate. This presents the educational administrator, however, with a considerable dilemma. Given the constraints of time, together with limited human and physical resources, how does the school compromise between the task of fostering pupil development and that of initiating young people into the public modes of knowledge and understanding that constitute their cultural heritage?

If this question is to be addressed within the context of educational administration, it is crucial to consider the ways in which the institution of schooling itself provides a set of conditions that can have either a constraining or an enabling effect upon the concept of education that is embodied in such a proposal as the CDC core curriculum. But the institution of schooling is not a static phenomenon. Schools are themselves cultural artefacts, assembled by the social actions of those who inhabit them and founded upon the patterns of meaning that those inhabitants share. The particular shape and quality that each school acquires is determined in large part by the image of schooling that prevails in the minds of those who control its organisational destiny.

This image of schooling is not a representation of organisational reality but rather something more akin to an *ideal type*, a reflection of the beliefs, values and assumptions that set limits upon what is held to be possible as well as what is thought to be appropriate roles and functions for schools to perform. For educational administrators at least four such images of schooling have emerged, with more or less degrees of clarity and influence, within a wide variety of educational contexts. These images are: (i) the *technocratic*, (ii) the *existential*, (iii) the *reproductive*, and (iv) the *reconstructive*. In the discussion that follows we shall examine the implications for educational administration of each of these four major images of schooling and suggest how they might lead to very different interpretations of the core curriculum proposal.

The technocratic image of schooling

As with technocratic rationality, the guiding interest of this image of schooling coalesces around the elements of control, prediction and certainty. It is an image which derives from the mechanistic language of technology and economics (or cost accounting). It incorporates such language as 'input' and 'output', 'cost', 'productivity', 'growth' and 'efficiency'. Teaching (and administration) becomes identified with implementing a grand scheme whereby everything is expected to fit into its appropriate slot in the flow chart—selected strategies leading to certain outcomes. Schools are conceived of as production systems and pedagogical or curricular problems are treated by employing technical procedures. Administration is seen to be essentially scientific and value free. Thus the evaluative focus is upon accountability, upon the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures, assuming that various alternative means can be evaluated independently of the particular ends that are sought.

The technocratic image carries the assumption that assessment and prediction can be completely objective and that teachers will always act in accordance with these predictions. No account is taken of individual idiosyncracy of action. It is always assumed that action proceeds in a systematic way from initial objective to the achievement of ends without any opportunity for spontaneous exploration or modification of the original objective along the way. The image fails to recognise that some actions are their own ends, that some actions cannot be defined in instrumental terms. But in failing to contain this recognition, the technocratic image can more readily reflect the established administrative structures and the political relationships by which they are maintained.

Perhaps it is this inherently conservative aspect of the managerial-technocratic model of schooling that has enabled it to endure for so long. As Giroux points out;

> schools in the early part of the century were viewed as factories, students as raw material, and educational issues concerning knowledge, values, and social relationships were reduced to the language of neutrality, technique, and strict means-ends reasoning. As theory was replaced by methodology in these fields, questions regarding moral values and ethics were framed within a logic that celebrated 'scientific' knowledge and bureaucratic organization (Giroux 1981, p. 10).

One of the ways in which this model of schooling has been manifested is in the accountability movement which began to gather momentum in the United States during the late 1960s and spread to most other western countries during the 1970s. Whereas previously the quality of schools

was assessed in terms of 'inputs' (e.g. expenditure per pupil; number of teachers per school; qualifications of teachers; school buildings and physical resources) a number of studies during the early 1960s, beginning with the Coleman Report (Department of Health and Welfare 1967), had cast doubt on the view that inputs alone could bring about improvements in the quality of education. Consequently, within the same technocratic image, the quality of schools began to be assessed in terms of certain 'outputs' (e.g. performance of students on standardised achievement tests). Thus accountability is a demand to judge schools by their outputs, to demonstrate a positive relationship between expenditures and desired results obtained. The following reading exemplifies this kind of demand and reveals its underlying political agenda.

Reading 12

L. M. Lessinger, 'Accountability for results: A basic challenge for America's schools', *American Education*, no. 5, June–July, 1969 pp. 2–4.

Activity 5.4

1. The strength of Lessinger's argument derives from the analogy between industry and education. Explain the essential features of this analogy as it relates to:

(a) the educational redevelopment plan

(b) the technology of teaching

(c) the concept of an 'educational audit'

2. What effects do you consider such accountability would have upon the quality of education?

Perhaps it is not surprising that the technocratic image of schooling has had a wide appeal for administrators. By the same token, the more seriously that administrators have addressed their concerns to *education*, rather than the management of schooling, the more they have been able to recognise the underlying value assumptions of the technocratic perspective. These assumptions are stated to be:

> that educational purposes are not deeply controversial, that human and institutional qualities can be abstracted and measured, that education is concerned with measurable effects, that there is no problem about the location of power, that social systems can be controlled by administrative action and that the curriculum theorist is a kind of scientist (Reid 1981, p. 164).

Such assumptions, as we have already shown, are not consistent with a fully articulated concept of education that is grounded in a rational and democratic critique. Indeed, they are assumptions which anathematise this very way of thinking about education and educational administration.

The existential image of schooling

During the same period that technocratic views were gaining influence and winning adherents, a powerful countermovement could be seen to emerge as a kind of antidote to the dehumanising ethos that accompanied the technocratic image. This countermovement generated an existential image of schooling which evolved around the notions of 'personal experience', 'subjective meaning' and 'human relationships'.

The existential perspective is drawn, in large part, from humanistic psychology which assumes that education is a personal phenomenon and that worthwhile change must recognise the primacy of the individual, the

power of emotions and the centrality of the life of the mind. It is a view of schooling that is imbued with interpretative rationality, in which the concepts of intentionality and intersubjective understanding are central. In opposition to the mechanistic determinism of 'scientific models' and 'bureaucratic structures' the existentialist interpretation focuses on the relationships of the individual consciousness to the external world. This relationship is grounded in the shared meanings and empathic understanding that exists between the people who dwell in particular institutions, rather than the administrative processes and established social structures that characterise those institutions.

Essentially, the existentialist image of schooling is psychological in character. As Reid (1981) comments, in referring to the existential perspective on curriculum, 'It is allied to the humanist, introspective psychology which is the polar opposite of the objectivist, psychometric psychology favoured by systemic theorists' (p. 166). This means that instruction, or any form of directive teaching, is considered undesirable because it denigrates the uniqueness of each individual's view of reality. In the following reading, for instance, the psychologist Carl Rogers puts forward a non-directive concept in terms of the 'facilitation of learning'. This whole way of viewing schooling seems to completely ignore the structural aspects of social relations based on power and status. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the personal dimensions of human relationships and gives a place of centrality to conditions of reciprocity, acceptance and trust in all forms of teacher-student interaction.

Reading 13
C. R. Rogers, 'The interpersonal relationship in the facilitation of learning' in R. R. Leeper (ed.), *Humanizing Education: The Persons in the Process*, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Washington D.C., 1967.

Activity 5.5
Taking Rogers' assumptions about teaching, what would it mean for an educational administrator to become 'a facilitator of learning'?

In spite of its opposition to the most oppressive features of technocratic schooling, the existential perspective fails to provide any basis for overcoming the constraints and controls which prevent the achievement of educational aims. Because it ignores the political dimensions of schooling, it tends to preserve the status quo and give conservative endorsement to the existing social arrangements. The existential image of schooling is both depoliticised and relativised, with positive change being confined to pedagogical approaches. Moreover, as Giroux points out:

> The interpretive pedagogical approaches attempted to promote a recovery of both the subject and intentionality in their pursuit of an alternative mode of educational theory and practice. Instead of seeing school knowledge as objective and value free, it was seen as a social construction tied to the interests, perceptions and experiences of those who produced and negotiated its meaning. Instead of teachers and students acting as agents of received values and truths, they were now viewed as producers of values and truths. As knowledge became relativized, modes of pedagogy developed that stressed experiences and interpersonal relations. Classroom practice seemed to disengage itself from the larger world as subjectivity and consciousness escaped from the objectivism of technocratic rationality (Giroux 1981, p. 12).

Thus, it might be concluded that the existential image of schooling ultimately has very little educational substance to offer the educational

administrator. It may well lead to the humanising of bureaucratic procedures; it may enable some management strategies to become more efficient, because they are more palatable; it may lubricate the interpersonal links in the organisational chain of command—but it will do little to transform the social context in which education ought to be administered. The point is well made by Taylor:

> Relationships within the school are not those of naked soul to naked soul. They are always and necessarily mediated by professional responsibilities and a commitment to the communication of knowledge and skills within public traditions of greater or less antiquity (Taylor 1976, p. 43).

The reproductive image of schooling

The fundamental assumption behind a reproductive image of schooling is that schools inevitably function to reproduce the hierarchical social order of a class-stratified society. The primary social function of the school is to maintain this reproductive process, and the dominant ideological forces exert a powerful influence on educational institutions and organisations to ensure that control is at the centre of all processes and activities within them. Thus we have a radical perspective on schools in which it is assumed that educational problems are ideologically determined and reform is not possible without a radical transformation of social and political institutions. Such a transformation would only be possible in a social context in which schools were not required to reproduce the social inequalities of a capitalist society. In the absence of such a social context, we have a highly deterministic image of schooling. As Giroux comments:

> Reproductive approaches have been particularly influential in the United States in stressing the determinate nature and primacy of political economy in educational theory and practice. For example, a number of theorists, such as Bowles and Gintis, have attempted to demonstrate how the reproduction of class relations occurs through a correspondence between the social relations of production and education. By insisting on the primacy of production relations as a determinate force in social and cultural reproduction, these critics have focussed attention on how unjust, class-specific forms of tracking, sorting, and selection mechanisms in schools can be traced back to the political and economic structures that govern them (Giroux 1981, p. 16).

In this view then, schools are part of the institutional state apparatus through which the dominant capitalist classes maintain their position of power and privilege. They achieve this not by physical force but by what has come to be called ideological hegemony. This concept is derived from the writings of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci and it has been defined in the following way:

> By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil society—including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family—of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it. Hegemony ... is diffused by agencies of ideological control and socialization into every area of daily life ... as all ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they necessarily attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc. and render them unchallengeable, part of the natural order of things (Boggs 1976, p. 39).

When it is applied to the school, this concept relates not only to the formal curriculum and its knowledge content but also to the way that content is structured, organised and valued within the daily life of the school. Ideological hegemony, moreover, is to be found in the very administrative and pedagogical practices which enable schools as institutions of learning and teaching to continue to function. Within the

reproductive image of schooling, this is a very powerful notion indeed and unfortunately leaves little room for the pursuit of defensible educational aims.

It is not surprising to find that in the area of curriculum design, the reproductive theorists will be less concerned with *how* a curriculum should be constructed or developed than with explaining the hegemonic determinant of curriculum proposals that are advanced within various administrative contexts. Indeed, this is precisely the kind of response that Apple (1982) makes to the CDC core curriculum document in the following reading:

Reading 14
M. W. Apple, 'Core curriculum and state control', *Discourse*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1982, pp. 1–10.

Activity 5.6
Apple argues that Core Curriculum for Australian Schools *contains a number of internal contradictions when the relationship between curriculum and society is considered. What are these contradictions and how can they be exemplified by reference to the CDC document itself?*

Although it contains many elements of critical rationality, the ultimate effect of the reproductive image of schooling is to foster an attitude of extreme pessimism, or even defeatism, in the minds of administrators and teachers who might otherwise hope to be able to change schools for the human betterment of those who pass through them. Giroux expresses this very forcefully when he writes of the reproductive approach:

> While this position does us the service of linking reproduction to the larger imperatives of the state, it deflates it own possibilities by defining ideology as a form of 'interpellation' in which subjects simply become bearers of imposed roles. Viewed in this way, schools become sites harmoniously linked through a powerfully unified ideology to other institutions that make up the wider society. Lost here is the notion of relative autonomy as well as the possibility of contradictions emerging among schools, the media, the state, the economy and other institutions (Giroux 1981, p. 18).

It is in this notion of relative autonomy that the concept of *administrator-as-educator* is to be found. For only if we can break out of the social determinism inherent in the reproductive image of schooling, can we envisage a role for educational administrators that goes beyond the management of existing social structures. This can be achieved only if we combine a critical form of rationality with an image of schools as relatively autonomous institutions, capable of achieving educational aims in addition to socialisation and social reproduction. To some extent, these possibilities can be found in the reconstructive image of schooling.

The reconstructive image of schooling

We have already suggested that behind each image of schooling lies an ideology which will set limits on the kinds of educational aims which are considered possible within the context of that image. In this sense, ideology refers to

> a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the organisation of society; a set of beliefs about man's nature and the world in which he lives; a claim that the two sets are interdependent; and a demand that those beliefs should be professed, and that claim conceded by anyone who is to be considered a full member of a certain social group (Corbett 1965, p. 12).

Now, in one sense, each of the images of schooling considered up to this point is permeated by an ideology in which individual human beings are considered incapable of altering the established social order. At best they can strive for more trusting and mutually supportive interpersonal relationships; at worst they are nothing more than stumbling cultural dupes unwittingly reproducing the social forces behind an unjust and oppressive society. These are not ideologies that give educational administrators much cause for hope.

Behind the reconstructive image of schooling, however, is an ideology in which individuals may look forward with a reasonable degree of expectation, to a situation in which democratic principles will prevail and where situations can be rationally assessed for their educational significance. The goal of administrative action, guided by this ideology, is to gradually transform institutions so that they become inhabited by critical communities – in which all the individuals engage in a free and open form of discourse aimed at developing a quality of organisational life such that participants can engage in critical self-reflection and deliberation on their own actions and commitments. The underlying administrative rationale is evolutionary in its social philosophy and pragmatic in its conception of how knowledge should relate to policy and action. It adopts a critical approach to administrative problems and assumes that theories are not certain explanations of facts, nor ideologically distorted constructions of reality, but the best approximations to truth that we can achieve, given the state of our knowledge and our critical abilities.

Reid provides a concise summary of the ideology behind the reconstructive image when he states:

> The assumptions of the deliberative position are diametrically opposed to those of the radical perspective, being broadly allied to those of classical liberalism. They comprise an emphasis on the individual as a morally responsible person, a belief in the possibility of improvement through working with present institutions, and in the efficacy of consensual approaches to the identification and solution of problems (Reid 1981, p. 167).

The basic ideal of reconstructionist ideology is the belief that the school, properly organised, can be one of the major forces for planned change in society. Rather than merely reflecting society in a mechanistic way, schools always have the capacity for achieving some degree of cultural renewal. Rather than stressing the hegemonic features of social institutions and traditions, the reconstructive image focuses upon their fluidity and modifiability. When viewed in this way, the school can be seen as an active agency for cultural change.

Reading 15

M. Skilbeck, 'The school and cultural development', in M. Golby, J. Greenwald, & R. West (eds), *Curriculum Design*, Croom Helm, London, 1975.

Activity 5.7

Skilbeck discusses four possible relationships between the school and the wider culture. Outline each of these possible conceptions of the school's cultural task and relate them to the various images of schooling discussed in this section.

By now it should be clear that there is a reconstructive image of schooling contained within the CDC proposal for a core curriculum.

Indeed, Skilbeck himself has pointed to the following reconstructionist qualities exhibited by the document:

> The cultural order envisaged by core is problematic and dynamic – it is not a fixed order to be transmitted but a product and function in part of social processes including education and schooling;
>
> Learning is envisaged as active, critical and reflective – an affirmation and reconstruction of experience not a reproduction in learning environments of established facts, skills, etc.;
>
> The social order is treated as a resource for learning and is susceptible to change through planned action;
>
> The school is conceived not merely as socially reproductive but is capable of engaging in socially and culturally creative enterprises; it mediates rather than transmits;
>
> The core is itself a map of possible cultures, not a reproduction of existing cultures;
>
> Learning is a form of mapping whereby possible cultures are translated into lived situations; the task of learning includes skills, techniques and concepts which enable learners to participate in culture creation (Skilbeck 1980, p. 27).

This provides a powerful guiding image for the educational administrator but it is also one that implies a dramatic reconceptualisation of the administrator's task. To some extent, it implies a move into the unknown. It produces a degree of ambiguity about the administrator's role and it acknowledges that the basis for administrative reform remains uncertain and somewhat contradictory. Nevertheless, the reconstructive image envisages a quality of educational administration which can reflect the vitality and integrity that comes from moral and philosophical enlightenment.

As schools become more like human communities having their own distinctive culture (and less like formal institutions mirroring the dominant culture of the wider society), the practices and processes which they embody are likely to acquire more and more intrinsic value, so that the goals of education are attained not only through the content of the curriculum, but also through the organisational structures that administrators create.

Conclusion

This section has attempted to develop the notion of 'administrator as educator' by reflecting upon the concept of formal education as it is realised within the institutional context of schooling. It began by questioning the educational value of managerial techniques and suggested that such techniques can be miseducative in so far as they serve to facilitate the social function of schooling as an agency of social control. However, because schools are not factories, and because the administration of education is not reducible to management strategies, it was argued that professional administrators should be distinguished by their overall commitment to a set of educational values and principles for practice, rather than their narrow proficiency in particular skills.

Thus, the view taken in this section is that the only concept of 'administration' that can be properly wedded to the concept of 'education' is one which preserves democratic administrative practices. If schools are to educate for democracy, they must embody within their own structures such central moral principles as justice, freedom and respect for persons, combined with an overriding concern for truth. It is only with the vigorous defence of these principles that schools can move beyond the narrow functions of socialisation to provide settings in which

individuals can become rational autonomous beings. The central aim of education is not passive social conformity but active and properly informed social critique.

An examination of the CDC document, *Core Curriculum for Australian Schools*, illustrates the importance of curriculum decision making to this conception of the administrator as educator. The CDC proposal takes the view that a core curriculum, embracing both content and process learnings, is a necessary condition for the pursuit of educational aims which are responsive to contemporary social and cultural change. This implies not only a careful justification for the selection of curriculum content, but also an image of schooling in which such a curriculum can be fully realised.

Different images of schooling will imply different conceptions of what is possible in terms of both the cultural content and the organisational structure of school curricula. Consequently, for educational administration, it is how the school is viewed as an institution within the wider social context that will determine the quality of administrative practice. This has been illustrated by sketching the main features of four contemporary images of schooling and considering their implications for educational administration.

From the technocratic image we have the dominant instrumental and mechanistic model of the school as a bureaucratic organisation. In contrast, the existential model places the subjectivity of the individual against an image of the school as a kaleidoscope of human encounters. From another more critical angle, however, we have the reproductive model of the school as a potent political force in the maintenance of an oppressive social structure. Finally, from an equally critical though less deterministic viewpoint, we have the reconstructive image of the school as a relatively autonomous institution capable of mediating the forces of cultural renewal and liberation.

By examining each of these images in relation to the administrator's role, it has been suggested that the reconstructive image of schooling is the one most compatible with a notion of administrator as educator. For not only is it an image that is imbued with a critical rationality, but it is one which recognises that the school's socialising role is always partial and incomplete, providing countless opportunities for self-knowledge, cultural penetration and social critique. Being able to take advantage of such opportunities, therefore, is the critical challenge of administrative practice—a challenge that is to be taken up in subsequent sections.

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